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‘When the world is changing very fast, I suggest survival may depend precisely on our 
ability to change rapidly in the face of changing conditions.’ – Carl Sagan
i  
 
‘The wealth of the world's rich countries has come largely as a result of cheap energy 
from fossil fuels, without realization of the damage being caused -- damage that is 
tending to fall disproportionately on poorer countries. There is therefore an 
inescapable moral imperative for wealthy countries: first, to take action to reduce 
drastically their emissions of carbon dioxide and, secondly, to use their wealth and 
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Executive Summary 
 
2007 is the 20
th anniversary of the Brundtland Commission’s influential report Our 
Common Future, which first put sustainable development on the international political 
agenda.  Five years later the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change defined an effective response to the challenge of anthropogenic climate 
change as a central plank of sustainable development. Over the last fifteen years the 
global scientific community has demonstrated beyond all reasonable doubt regarding 
that it is necessary to radically curtail growth in greenhouse gas emissions and 
stabilize atmospheric concentrations at a much lower level than will occur if accepted 
projections of energy use prove accurate.  
 
Most rich industrialized countries, including Canada, Japan and the countries of the 
European Union accepted an historic, legal and moral responsibility to act first to 
reduce emissions. To date, they have seldom kept their pledges.  In order ensure that 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases do not rise above 400 to 
450ppmvC02(e) by 2050 with reduction thereafter, these countries, and others, will 
need to cut their emission by 80% or more by that date.  
 
This paper outlines the concept of carbon budgeting and the performance of the 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the European Union in managing and reducing 
emissions to date. It examines the strengths and weaknesses of some approaches to 
delivering greater emissions reductions, and identifies some policies for accelerating 
change in future.  
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1. An overview carbon budgeting 
 
1.1. Context, definitions, key parameters 
 
Anthropogenic climate change may present the greatest single challenge to human 
development in the 21
st century and beyond
iii.  Emissions of greenhouse gases to date 
already commit the planet to significant climatic change, but some of the most severe 
future adverse impacts may be avoided if effective action is taken now and 
continuously for the next few decades. Such action must include steep reduction in 
emissions of greenhouse gases. 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change commits its 
signatories to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere ‘at a level 
that [will] prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ 
Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient: 
 
- To allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change 
- To ensure that food production is not threatened and; 
- To enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. 
 
All three of these conditions must be met if human development is to continue.     
 
It has often been argued that dangerous climate change
iv, breaking at least one of 
these conditions, will occur if the average global temperature rises by more than 2 
degrees Celsius
v with regard to the pre-industrial average
vi.   The “carbon budget” is 
the total amount of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases
vii that the world can 




The size of that carbon budget is much contested.    The scientific basis for any 
agreement between UN members is likely to be the work of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change
ix. In the summary for policy makers of the Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4)
x, the IPCC sets
xi the range of likely of climate equilibrium 
sensitivity for a doubling atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases
xii at 
between 2 to 4.5°C, with a best estimate of 3°C. That is, they say there is greater than 
66% probability
xiii that the global average temperature will rise by more than 2°C 




There are deductive and observational reasons for considering that the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report summary (AR4) understates the degree of risk. AR4 may, for 
example, underestimate positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle
xv (and indeed the 
summary states that “values substantially higher than 4.5°C [for doubling of CO2] 
cannot be excluded”).   It may also be out of date because it omits recent observations 
such as the release of greenhouse gases, including methane, from thawing tundra
xvi 
and more rapid rise in sea levels than has previously been predicted.  
 
A study
xvii commissioned for the UK government estimates that the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases would need to be stabilised at less than 450ppm 
CO2 equivalent
xviii in order to have a 60% chance of avoiding a rise in global average 
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temperature of more than 2°C.  To have a 90% chance it may need to be stabilised as 
low as 400ppm CO2e
xix.  Recommendations that concentration be limited to such a 
low level have been discounted the grounds that are unlikely to be achievable
xx.  It 
should be noted, however, that an atmospheric concentration of 450ppm CO2e and 
even 400ppm CO2e may still entail considerable risk of dangerous climate change
xxi, 
and is likely at the least to lead to climate change with high adaptation costs. 
 
The gap between such a target and most projections is very large. On current trends, 
atmospheric concentrations may rise to 900ppmv or more this century
xxii.   To 
stabilise at 450ppmv or less would require very large changes in the way the world 
generates and uses energy.  Many analysts, including those recommending radical 
action on climate change, consider such a goal to be close to unachievable
xxiii. 
 
Leading climate scientists have issued stark warnings regarding the urgency of the 
need to reduce human impacts
xxiv. “We have already passed the stage of dangerous 
climate change. The task now is to avoid catastrophic climate change” says John 
Holdren, President of the American Academy for the Advancement of Science
xxv. 
“Recent greenhouse gas emissions place the Earth perilously close to dramatic climate 
change that could run out of our control, with great dangers for humans and other 




1.2.  Carbon budgeting for Australia, Canada, the European Union and Japan 
 
How large is the global ‘carbon budget’ consistent with not exceeding an atmospheric 
concentration of 400 to 450 CO2e?  This cannot be determined precisely because, as 
noted above, there are uncertainties as to how the Earth’s biogeochemical system 
reacts to rapid changes in atmospheric, ocean and terrestrial chemistry and 
temperature resulting from human activity
xxvii. A quantum of direct anthropogenic 
emissions (from activities such as fossil fuel combustion and land use change) may 
cause an additional but uncertain and changing quantum of emissions from natural 
stocks such as forests, soils and oceans
xxviii.  This inherent uncertainty and risk 
supports the case for additional caution.    
 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), a synthesis of the scientific knowledge 
available that is endorsed by all UN member states
xxix, says
xxx that “to stabilise at 
450ppm CO2
xxxi
 could require that cumulative emissions over the 21st century be 
reduced from approximately 607 [630 to 710] [Gigatonnes
xxxii of carbon] to 
approximately 490 [375 to 600] GtC” . 
xxxiii
 
To limit emissions to no more 490 GtC during the 21
st Century may require 
cumulative emissions at the bottom of end of or even below the range envisaged 
under scenario B1 in the IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
xxxiv. That is, 
total global emissions would have to peak at no more than approximately 10GtC per 
year by about 2020 and begin to fall soon after 2030 to well under half (perhaps under 
a third) of current levels by the end of the 21
st century.   
 
At present total global emissions of carbon dioxide only from combustion of fossil 
fuels are estimated to be more than 7.4 GtC per year
xxxv,
xxxvi Of these, more than 25% 
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are estimated to originate from the United States
xxxvii and more than 24% from 
Australia, Canada, the European Union and Japan combined
xxxviii.   
 
It should be noted that about 40% of the heat trapped by anthropogenic gases is due to 
gases other than carbon dioxide, primarily methane.
xxxix
 
Historically, if not always today, the rich industrial countries are the biggest absolute 
emitters, and typically their emissions per capita remain far above the global 
average
xl. Typically, too, these countries have the greatest capacity to invest and 
innovate
xli.   Many policy makers agree that low and middle-income nations, with 
more than four fifths of global population but accounting for only about half of total 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, have a right to continue to increase their 
consumption of fossil fuels.  Because there is little or no space for an increase in total 
global emissions without substantial increase in the risk of dangerous climate change, 
this means that the rich industrial countries must reduce their share of the total. 
 
The current international framework offers a basis for greater emission cuts in future 
by nations that are already rich and industrialised even while many other nations 
increase their emissions at least in the short term. The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
xlii, recognises the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities,”
xliii with greater responsibility for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions in the near term on the part of the most industrialised countries (known 
as the Annex 1 countries
xliv). The UNFCC itself is non-binding, but the Kyoto 
Protocol operationalises this principle, with cuts with respect to 1990 levels 




In order to play a role
xlvii in avoiding dangerous climate change, Australia, Canada, 
Japan and the countries of the European Union must (along with other rich 
industrialised nations) strongly intensify their commitments to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.  A study
xlviii published by the UK government indicates that by 2020 their 
[European Union?] emissions will need to be 25% below 1990 levels to be on track 
for stabilisation at 400ppm, and 15-20% below 1990 levels for stabilisation at 
450ppm. By 2050 their emissions will need to be between 90% (for 400ppm) and 
80% (for 450ppm) below 1990 levels. 
 
Let us assume
xlix total global emissions peaking at around 10GtC per annum from 
2020 to 2030, declining to 7GtC in 2050 and 3GtC in 2100. 
 
An 80% cut in 1990 emissions by Australia, Canada, Japan and the European Union 
would mean total net emissions per annum rom all these countries of 1,242 Million 
tonnes CO2 equivalent (see table 1), or 338.6 MtC(e)
l, which is approximately 5% of 
assumed total global emissions of 7GtC in 2050. 
 
 
Table 1  
 
a) net emissions (million tonnes CO2 equivalent) 
 
    1990    2004    80%  cut  on 
1990 level 
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Australia
li    551.9    564.7    110.38 
 
Canada
lii    602    758    120.4 
 
EU (25)
liii    4000    3964    800 
 
Japan
liv   1059    1206    211.8 
 
 
b) net emissions per capita (C02e) 
 
Australia
lv    30.66    28.23    6.13 
 
Canada
lvi    21.5    25.26    4.3 
   
EU  (25)      8.5      8.43    1.7 
 
Japan     8.2    9.27    1.64 
 
 
As noted above, in 2004 Australia, Canada, the European Union and Japan currently 
account for just over 24% of total global emissions of carbon dioxide from 
combustion of fossil fuels and approximately 10% of the global population
lvii.   By 
2050 the proportion of the world’s total population living in these countries is likely 
to be around 8%
lviii. 
 
If total global emissions in 2050 are 7.5GtC per annum and world population is 9.4bn, 
then global [mean] per capita emissions will be 0.79tC or approximately 2.9tCO2 
(that is, approximately 75% to current global average per capita emissions of 
3.87tCO2).  On this scenario, Europe and Japan would be significantly below the 
global [mean] per capita for the year 2050, but not necessarily the long-term historical 
average. (It is estimated, for example, that in 2007 Europe is responsible for 30% of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases added to the atmosphere from the beginning of 




2.  Description of current structure of carbon emissions by sector, 
and trends  
 
2.1. Overview  
 
Australia, Canada, Japan and many of the major countries in the European Union 
have increased their emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
significantly since 1990
lx.   All of these countries, with the exception of Australia, 
have committed to reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.   Among the largest 
economies in this group discussed in this paper only two – Germany and the United 
Kingdom – are on track to meet their Kyoto targets. On current trends, almost all 
countries in this group are very far from achieving the kind of future cuts described in 
section 1 above
lxi.   
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Australia’s net emissions increased by 2.3% between 1990 and 2004. (Emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion increased by some 34.7% but were offset by land use change 
etc). The country is expected to emit 21.8% more in 2010 than the target it would 
have had if had signed the Kyoto protocol, and its emissions for 2020 are projected to 
be 127% of the 1990 level.  At present, Australia has by some margin the highest per 
capita emissions among the group of countries under discussion.  
 
Canada’s emissions increased by 27% between 1990 and 2005. Under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the country has agreed to a 6% cut on 1990 levels between 2008-2012.   Its 
projected emissions for that period are 25.9% above its target. 
 
Japan’s emissions in 2005 were approximately 8.1% above their 1990 level.  It is 
projected that it will exceed its Kyoto target by 11%. Under the Kyoto Protocol Japan 
has committed to reducing emissions by 6% in the 2008-2012 period
lxii. Our 
research
lxiii indicates that at the time of writing, official long-term projections for 
greenhouse gas emissions do not exist. However, in 2005 the Ministry for Economy, 
Trade and Industry produced cases (scenarios) as part a projection for energy and 
demand and supply to 2030.  Its reference case (‘business as usual’) emissions are 
projected to rise to  rise by about 13% above 1990 levels  by 2020 and fall slightly to 
about 9% above 1990 levels by 2030.  In its ‘Energy Conservation Progress’ case 
emissions are projected to fall to about the same as their 1990 levels in 2020 and 
about 10% below their 1990 levels by 2030. The Japanese National Institutes for 
Environmental Studies has argued that a 70% reduction in Japanese emissions could 
be achieved by 2050 at a cost of 1% of GDP. In May 2007 Japanese Prime Minister 
Shinzo Abe suggested a global target of a 50% reduction in emissions by 2050. 
Japanese officials said the reduction target was nonbinding and was a general 'vision' 
rather than an ironclad goal
lxiv. 
 
For the European Union 25 (i.e. not including Bulgaria and Romania) total 
greenhouse gas emissions (not including emissions and removals from land use, land 
use change and forestry, or LULUCF), decreased by 4.8 % between 1990 and 2004
lxv.  
But this figure hides significant differences between countries.  Emissions by the EU's 
original 15 members
lxvi are projected to be 0.6% below 1990 levels by 2010. The EU-
15 countries are committed under the Kyoto protocol to an 8% cut on 1990 levels by 
2008- 2012. Only 5 of the 15 are on track to meet their burden sharing targets. 
Greenhouse gas emissions have declined substantially in almost all new EU member 
states, mainly because of the restructuring or closure of heavily polluting and energy-
intensive industries after 1989. In 2004, new member state emissions were 23 % 
below 1990 level. All new member states which have a Kyoto target were on track to 




Case study: The Swedish approach – a model for the rest of Europe? 
 
In 2005 the Swedish government announced their intention to become the first 
country in the world to break their dependence on oil and other ‘fossil fuel raw 
materials’ by 2020
lxvii. The government cited the threat of climate change as one of 
four key reasons for the policy
lxviii.  
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The announcement left environmentalists and others wondering whether larger 
countries in Europe, such as Germany, France and the UK, as well smaller ones such 
as Ireland
lxix, could follow a similar path.  
 
Sweden has a big head start. Its electricity, for example, is already generated with 
next to no use of fossil fuels. Around half comes from hydropower and the remainder 
largely from nuclear. The UK, by contrast, already gets more than 70 per cent of its 
electricity from coal and gas, with less than five per cent from hydro and less than 20 
per cent from nuclear. And with a land area nearly twice the size of the UK but home 
to one seventh the population, Sweden has far more space to produce biomass-mainly 
crops and wood-for conversion to fuels such as ethanol or for high temperature 
gasification and efficient combustion In 2005 the Swedish government announced 
their intention to become the first country in the world to ‘break their dependence’ on 
oil and other ‘fossil fuel raw materials’ by 2020. The government cited the threat of 
climate change of as one the key reasons for the policy, but identified four other key 
rationales for following this route: that it would secure Sweden’s supply of energy in 
the long term; that would help Sweden become a leading nation in the development of 
new technology for sustainable use of energy and more efficient use of energy; that it 
would strengthen international economic competitiveness; and that it would use and 
develop the country’s rich energy resources from forests and fields. 
 
In 2006 a newly appointed national Commission on Oil Independence published a 
strategy for achieving this goal, titled Making Sweden an Oil-Free Society
lxx. The 
Commission proposed as national objectives that:  
  
• Swedish society as a whole should be able to make 20 per cent more efficient use of 
energy by 2020 and thereby at the same time create intensified, cost-effective 
prosperity that is sustainable in the long term  
• By 2020 in principle no oil should be used for heating residential and commercial 
buildings   
• Road transport, including transport in the agricultural, forestry, fisheries and 
building sectors, should reduce use of petrol and diesel by 40-50 per cent by 2020  
• Industry should reduce its use of oil by 25-40 per cent by 2020  
 
The Commission stressed that despite the inclusion of the worlds ‘Oil-Free’ in the 
title of its report, was ‘to reduce as far as possible actual consumption of oil by the 
year 2020’…and ‘to reduce the one-sided dependence on oil in areas where total 
independence from oil will take much longer to achieve, for example in the transport 
sector’.   It also proposed the development of ‘models, control instruments and 
concrete measures’ to reduce dependence coal and natural gas as well.  
 
Central to the Swedish strategy are the twin agendas to improve efficiency in energy 
use across all sectors (‘Radically more effective use of energy by the whole of 
society’) and rapid upscaling in the production and use biofuels and biopower from 
forest and agricultural land (‘Historic investment in forest fuels and energy crops’). 
The Commission also proposed a thorough review of electricity generation, including 
increased domestic production from renewable resources and enhanced demand 
management measures, and strategic investment in energy gases derived from 
biomass. It also identifies ‘control instruments at EU level’ as crucial for Sweden’s 
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continued competitiveness:  the Europe wide ceiling for the number of emission rights 
needs to be gradually lowered.  
 
The ambition and scope of the Swedish approach has attracted considerable attention 
and admirers around the world. But its example should be seen in perspective. Few 
countries enjoy a similar combination of advantages, including a highly advanced 
knowledge-rich economy, well developed co-operation between government, business 
and society, and abundant resources for biofuels (Sweden and Finland the largest 
acreage of woodland per inhabitant in the European Union).  And – with the 
programme less than a year old at the time of writing – Sweden is yet to demonstrate 





There is notable divergence with regard to trends and projections from the electrical 
power sector among the countries included in this study  
 
Australian power sector emissions increased by 43% between 1990 and 2004, from 
195.7 to 279.9 MT CO2e 
 
Canadian power sector emissions increase  
 
EU power sector emissions 
 








Since at least the 1970s many have advocated more widespread deployment of 
renewable energy technologies such as wind and solar power as a solution to security 
and environmental challenges.   In practice these technologies have often remained at 
the margin of the energy production, contributing little more than one or two per cent 
of energy demand in the large industrial economies.   
 
This track record has reinforced a widely held perception that renewables will remain 
peripheral, and that nuclear power and the continued use of fossil fuels such as coal 
(with the addition of carbon capture and storage) remain essential to wealth 
generation in the 21
st century is necessary.   
 
But the experience of Germany (the world's biggest exporter, the third largest 
economy in US$ exchange rate terms, the fifth largest by purchasing power parity 
and the largest economy in Europe) from the late 1990s to date indicates that this 
perception is misplaced.  A set of policies centring on what are known as ‘feed-in 
tariffs’ (FITs) have enabled a rapid uptake of new renewable energy to the point 
where in 2006 they supplied nearly 12% of total gross electricity demand and 5.3% of 
total primary energy consumption, accounting for €21.6 billion (US$29bn) total 
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turnover and  €8.7 billion ($11.7bn) worth of investment that year. 
 
The history of FITs in Germany shows how a gradual, trial-and-error approach to 
renewables can accelerate the deployment of new clean technologies despite well 
entrenched opposition from powerful industrial-political lobbies for coal, lignite and 
other more established energy technologies. 
 
Feed in tariffs place a legal obligation on utilities to purchase electricity from 
renewable energy installations. Typically, the tariff rate is guaranteed for a period of 
up to 20 years and determined for each technology to ensure profitable operation of 
the installation. The costs are shared among all end-users so that no-one is overly 
burdened.  
 
Renewable energy technologies developed thanks to the favourable economic and 
regulatory climate created by feed-in tariffs have generated billions of dollars a year 
in German exports, created nearly a quarter of a million jobs and saved 97 million 
tonnes of CO2 in 2006. It has also set records for installed capacity across many 
renewable technologies at the cost to date of around €1.50 ($1.80) per household per 
month.  
 
Some thirty countries (but not yet the US, Japan or the UK) are now following the 
German model, though with differences in detail of the way the law is designed. One 
example is tariff ‘degression’ so that a new renewable energy technology such as 
photovoltaics (PV) gets a lower tariff rate if installed some years hence rather than 
this year or next.  This encourages swift take-up and encourages manufacturers to 
increase design efficiency on the principle that if you going to receive a lower rate, 






2.3.  Transport 
 
2.3.1.  Overview 
 
Emissions from transport have, in most cases, been rising faster than any other sector 
in the world’s mature industrial economies. This is likely to present one of the 
greatest challenges to a drive to reduce emissions. Vehicle fleet average fuel 
efficiency is increasing very slowly, while targets set for biofuel consumption are 
likely to make little if any contribution to emission reduction in the short and medium 
term, and without policy changes could have significant adverse impacts.  Aviation 
and shipping both presents significant challenges if greenhouse gas emissions are to 
be cut.  The emissions from these sectors are not included in national reporting or 
international mechanisms. 
 
Australian transport emissions increased by 23.4% between 1990 and 2004, from 61.7 
to 76.2 MtCO2e 
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Canadian transport emissions accounted for 28% of the total increase in national 
emissions between 1990 and 2004 – an additional 44 MtCO2e raising the total to 
197MtCO2e. 
 
European Union transport emissions grew by 32% between 1990 and 2004 
(increasing their share of total emissions from 21% in 1990 to 28% by 2004)
lxxiii. This 
makes transport the worst performing sector and seriously jeopardises the 
achievement of the European Union’s Kyoto targets. Even in 10 new member states 
which joined the Union in 2004 (and where emissions overall fell sharply with 
economic restructuring after the fall of communism), emissions from transport in 
2004 exceeded 1990 levels by 28 %.  
 
Japanese transport emissions increased by 18.1% between 1990 and 2005, from 217 
to 257 MtCO2e 
 
2.3.2.  Cars in the European Union  
 
Emissions from ‘light duty vehicles’ (passenger cars and vans) are responsible for 
approximately half of EU transport emissions. The benefits of increased efficiency are 
clear.  For example, cutting average new car emissions in the EU from the 2005 
average of 162grams of carbon dioxide per kilometre to 120g/km by 2012, as was 
originally envisaged, would reduce car CO2 emissions 11% – that is, more than 5% of 
all emissions from transport (not including aviation), and up to 2% of total EU 
emissions.  An EU voluntary agreement with automobile manufacturers was supposed 
to reduce average new car emissions from 186g in 1998 to 140g by 2008. By 2005 
this was off course, with emissions averaging 162g/km.  
 
In January 2007, following pressure from the EU auto industry and the German 
government, the European Commission set looser emissions limits for new cars. The 
commission voted in favour on proposals to impose a mandatory CO2 emissions limit 
of 130g per km on all new cars from 2012 (check). Its original plan to set the target at 
120g had bee shelved last week after a vigorous dispute
lxxiv. 
 
In February 2007 EU country energy ministers agreed to increase the share of biofuels 
used in transport to 10% by 2020. The move was opposed by many civil society 
groups, who argued that the target be likely to lead to an increase in actual net 
emissions and would undermine the European Union’s commitment to sustainable 
development
lxxv.  (see box on fuels in section 2.4 below) 
 
Three-quarters of the 20 major car brands sold in Europe in 2005 to improve fuel 
efficiency at the rate needed to meet a key EU climate target
lxxvi.  
 
There is evidence that automakers exaggerate compliance costs for safety or 
environmental regulation by 2 to 10 times actual cost (e.g. seat belts, catalytic 
converters, air bags). 
 
2.3.3.  Aviation  
 
Worldwide, commercial aviation is growing by 5% a year while the projected 
improvement in jetliner fuel efficiency is 2% or less per year. Most analysts agree that 
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there is unlikely to be a viable alternative to jet fuel (kerosene) in the years up to 
2050
lxxvii.  Aviation is excluded from international inventories of greenhouse gases for 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that pollution from high-
flying jets is up to four times as damaging to the environment as the same amount 
released by chimneys and other exhaust pipes at ground level
lxxviii.  
 
The Advisory Council for Aeronautics Research in Europe, a body made up of 
representatives from industry, government, and academia, has launched what it calls a 
strategy that includes halving carbon dioxide emissions and reducing nitrogen oxide 
emissions by 80%, but ACARE envisages no timetable for these goals, saying only 
that the cuts will come some time beyond 2020. 
 
Some commercial organisations point Virgin airlines plans to invest $3bn in 
developing ecologically friendly plant-based jet fuel.  Ethanol weighs 60% more per 
unit volume than kerosene, and you need 64% more volume to get the same energy. 
An ethanol fuelled 737 would need a 25% larger wing and engines with 50% more 
thrust just to get airborne.   In 2002, Britain’s Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution concluded that because of such problems, aeroplanes will continue to rely 
on kerosene for at least 40 years
lxxix.  
 
Hydrogen doesn’t generate carbon dioxide but it provides only one quarter as much 
energy as the same volume of kerosene so the fuel tanks would have to be four times 
as large to carry a hydrogen fuelled plane the same distance. Hydrogen also produces 
about three times as much water vapour as kerosene when it burns.   Above 9000m – 
where airliners spend most of their time – this would create larger contrails which in 
turn form cirrus clouds that contribute to global warming.    
 
Increased efficiency will created some benefits, but even on the most optimistic 
scenarios these are most unlikely to alter the upward trajectory of emissions to less 
than 3% per year.  If countries are to reduce their total emissions of greenhouse gases 
they will have to 1) take account of aircraft emissions in their national totals; and 2) 
choose whether to limit those emissions by putting caps on air travel or making 




Box: UK aviation  
 
The United Kingdom generates more flights than any other European country.  A fifth 
of all international passengers worldwide are on flights that arrive or leave from UK 
airports.  Growth in aviation is considered essential to UK prosperity.  Emissions 
from aviation are omitted in UK reporting of its greenhouse emissions.   
 
There has been fierce debate in the UK over how much the impact of emissions from 
aviation. Industry figures put the figure at around 2% but this appears to be the global 
average rather than an accurate figure for the UK. A more generally accepted figure is 
around 5.5%
lxxx [reference]. This does not, however, take account of the fact that 
emissions by aircraft have a greater impact – three to four times as much forcing – 
  14Draft only – not for quotation   
compared to emissions at ground level. If the generally accepted figure of 5.5% is 
multiplied by 3 to account for forcing from nitrous oxide and water vapour then the 
actual contribution of aviation to the impact of UK emissions on the climate may now 
closer to 18%. 
 
UK emissions from aviation doubled between 1990 and 2000.  During the same 
period, the combined emissions of carbon dioxides from all other UK activities fell by 
approximately 9%.  Most forecasts indicate that UK aviation emissions will more than 
double again between 2000 and 2030, and could increase to between 4 and 10 times 
their 1990 level by 2050 on a “business as usual” trend. 
 
Even at the lower end of the forecast range, carbon dioxide emissions from aviation 
are set to reach 17MtC (62.39 MtCO2) by 2050. The higher end of the range is 44MtC 
(161.48 MtCO2).  The UK has a target to reduce its carbon emissions from all 
activities by 60% from 1990 levels to 65MtC (238.55 MtCO2) by 2050. These growth 
forecasts already allow for improvements that may be achieved through changes in air 
traffic management, other operation procedures and technological development.  If 
these do not occur emissions could be even higher. Thus, the UK will be unable to 
meet its targets for reducing climate change impacts without decisive action to curb 
the demand for air travel.   
 
Most of the recent expansion in air travel has occurred because people with higher 
incomes are flying more often. The greatest growth has been in international leisure 
flights, which now outnumber business flights made by UK residents by five to one. 
The UK is increasingly developing an air dependent culture. If action to tackle flying 
is postponed, says critics of current policy, Britain will enter an era in which frequent 
flying is increasingly the norm for better-off households, with lifestyles adapted to 
this expectation. 
 
Aviation does bring economic benefits, including employment, and these would be 
impacted if future growth were curbed.  But, say critics of current policy, this would 
be offset by public revenue from a more appropriate fiscal package for aviation and 
the potential effect of higher airfares on the UK’s growing tourism deficit, which 







Greenhouse gas emissions from shipping are thought to be double those of aviation 
and increasing fast.  At present they are in the range 600 to 800m MtCO2, or 4 to 5% 
of the global total. This is nearly double the UK’s, total emissions and more than all 
African countries combined. It is estimated they could grow by up to 75% in the next 
15 to 20 years if world trade continues to grow as projected and no action is taken to 
improve energy efficiency. Carbon dioxide emissions from ships do not come under 




2.3. Industry and other  
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Australian emissions from industrial processes increased by 18% between 1990 and 
2004 from 25.3 to 29.8 MtCO2e. Emissions from the waste sector decreased by 0.7% 
from 19.2 to 19.1 MtCO2e 
 
Canada – non-energy industrial emissions accounted for 18% of the total in 2004 
(136.4 MtCO2e), a slight decrease on 1990 levels. 
 
Japanese emissions from industrial processes decreased by 3.2% between 1990 and 
2005, from 482 to 466 MtCO2e 
 
European Union emissions from industrial processes. 
 
Case Study – Canadian oil and gas sector
lxxxiii  
 
A 67% increase in GHG emissions from the oil and gas sector accounted for one-third 
of Canada’s total increase in emissions between 1990 and 2004. 
 
Energy production is one of the cornerstones of the Canadian economy. Roughly 40% 
of Canada’s greenhouse gas production is associated with the production and 
distribution of energy for domestic use and for export
lxxxiv. Oil and gas represents 
over 90% percent of Canadian energy exports. Canada is currently the largest foreign 
supplier of oil to the United States. Growth in the oil and gas sector since 1990 has 
helped drive the record growth in the Canadian economy and the increase in GHG 
emissions.  
 
The primary reason is the development of the tar sands or oil sands in Alberta. Oil 
sands are a mixture of sand, silt, water, clay and bitumen, a thick tar-like mix of 
hydrocarbons. The bitumen deposits in three regions of northern Alberta – Athabasca, 
Cold Lake and Peace River – together may represent the largest known reserve of 
extractable oil on the planet. Unlike conventional oil, however, the highly viscous 
bitumen is not recoverable through wells. Instead, it must be extracted either by more 




The mining method, responsible for 61% of current extraction in Canada (2006 
data
lxxxvi), involves stripping away the overlying layers of soil and directly removing 
the oil sands. The in situ methods involve removing the bitumen from the sands 
underground. The most common approach, used in 28% of extraction, is to add steam 
heat to the underlying sands. This makes the bitumen less viscous, allowing it to flow 
to the well. After extraction, the majority of the separated bitumen is then upgraded to 
create synthetic crude oil. The synthetic crude can be upgraded by refineries into 
transportation fuel or other products.  
 
Development in the Alberta oil sands first began in 1960s. It did not expand until the 
1990s, when the depletion of other oil reserves, the availability of natural gas to drive 
extraction and higher oil price made development more attractive and cost-efficient. 
From 1996 to 2004, $34 billion was spent on new projects
lxxxvii. By May 2006, oil 
sands projects accounted for 62% of all major projects listed by the Economic 
Development department of the Alberta Government
lxxxviii. The Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers and the Canadian National Energy Board estimates that 
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roughly $95 billion will be spent in construction of oil sands operations from 2006-
2016, including capital expenditures and money to sustain capital. Total output from 
the oil sands was 1.1 million barrels per day in 2005 and is expected to at least triple 
by 2015. With a decline in conventional oil production, the oil sands are expected to 
represent 80% of Canada’s oil production by 2020
lxxxix. 
 
The challenge for producers is the energy-intensive extracting, refining and 
processing the oil from the oil sands currently can generate anywhere two to four 
times the GHG emissions of conventional oil drilling. The rapid development in the 
oil sands is the prime reason that GHG emission from the oil and gas sector increased 
by more than 50% from 1990 to 2004 and that Alberta surpassed Ontario as the 
largest emitting province. For example, 79% of emissions of Suncor, Inc, one of 
largest oil and gas firms in Canada, now come from its oil sands operations
xc. 
Continued oil sands development is expected to account for 41-47% of national 
emissions growth to 2010
xci. The GHG emission from the oil sands could increase by 
three to five times by 2020
xcii. 
 
The economic opportunity in the oil sands has led the oil and gas industry in Canada 
and the province of Alberta to oppose binding national GHG emissions targets in the 
past
xciii. However, Canada’s Auditor General recently indicated that the federal 
government must identify targets for GHG emissions reductions from oil and gas and 
develop an implementation plan
xciv. The increasing capital expenditure in the carbon-
intensive oil sands is expected to be one of the central challenges in achieving long-
term emissions reductions in Canada. Since oil sands projects are expected to have a 
lifespan of 30 years or more, current and planned investments could commit Canada 
to continued emissions growth.  
 
The best opportunity for mitigating emissions from the oil sands without harming the 
economy may be the development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology. 
Multiple levels of governments and energy corporations have begun supporting 
demonstration projects that capture CO2 generated during the extraction process in 
Alberta and inject into geological reservoirs. An ongoing international storage and 
monitoring project in an oil field in Weyburn, Saskatchewan is currently the largest 
carbon sequestration project in the world. The technology is potentially attractive to 
energy companies operating in western Canada because the injected CO2 could 
enhance oil recovery. While current CCS projects have produced negligible emissions 
reduction (at the national level), they have indicated the potential for expansion. One 
obstacle in will be developing a pipeline to rout CO2 from its source in the Alberta to 
the ideal locations for geological storage in neighbouring Saskatchewan.  
 
An emissions policy centered on CCS technology could eventually help Canada 
achieve carbon-neutral growth
xcv. One study estimated that oil sands activities could 
become carbon-neutral by 2020 through investing in CCS, improving energy 
efficiency, switching to low-carbon fuels (e.g. biofuels) to drive extraction processes, 
and purchasing offsets
xcvi. The cost was estimated a 2-14 US$ per barrel of oil, which 
could be acceptable if oil prices remain high
xcvii. A potential means for funding 
development of CCS technology would be requiring foreign purchasers of energy 
from the oil sands to also fund offsetting emissions from the extraction and 
production process. 
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Case Study – Spanish construction sector
xcviii
 
Among Annex I countries, Spain has experienced the second largest increase in GHG 
emissions since 1990
xcix. This trend largely reflect the overall improved socio-
economic situation in Spain during the 1990s which was characterized by strong 
economic growth, a construction boom (150,000 new buildings every year), an 
increase in the size of houses, an increase in the overall use of domestic electrical 
appliances, the introduction of domestic central heating systems, and the resulting 
continuously increasing demand for electricity consumption, including significant 
additional energy demands resulting from tourism.  
 
The main measures in the residential, commercial and institutional sectors are related 
to the normative preparation and regulation process to obtain more efficiency and 
energetic savings in new and existing buildings. Among those rules it has to be 
emphasized those linked with the 2002/91/CE Directive about energetic efficiency of 
buildings, with are specified in the Technical Code of Buildings (Código Técnico de 
la Edificación), the overhaul of the Regulation for Thermal Installations of Buildings 
(Reglamento de Instalaciones Térmicas de los Edificios), and the Energetic 
Certification of Buildings (Certificación Energética de Edificios). The Action Plan 
2005-2007 of the Energy Efficiency Strategy for Spain sets measures to reduce the 
energetic costs, focusing in three sub sectors: construction, public services, and 
residential and IT equipment. These measures promote the increase of the energetic 
efficiency of buildings, particularly those of new construction, as well as the public 
lighting, installations for water cleaning processing and a plan for the updating of 
electrical appliances stimulating the use of efficient equipment in new buildings and 
in the public administration. 
 
The Technical Code of Buildings establishes three strategic measures: 
 
1.  Renovation of thermal envelope of existing buildings and  limiting energy 
demand for new buildings.  
2.  Improvement of energetic efficiency of existing heating, lighting and air – 
conditioning systems. 
3.  Use of PV solar energy to produce electricity. 
 
The implementation of such measures may result in up to a 40% saving for each 
building and a CO2 emission reduction of up to 55%
c. 
  
The energy labeling of buildings is also part of the 2002/91/CE directive. Such 
initiative enables users to know the energetic performance and characteristics of new 
built buildings.  Such information aims to set a market and add value to those 
buildings with high energetic efficiency and, thus, promote investments in energy 





2.4. Agriculture, Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry  
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Australian emissions from agriculture increased by 2.2% between 1990 and 2004 
from 91.1 to 93.1 MT CO2e. Australian emissions from LULUCF decreased by 
72.5% over the same period from 128.9 to 35.5 MT CO2e 
 
Canada figures are sought 
 
European Union figures are sought 
 




Biofuels are often seen as a major constituent part of a sustainable global energy 
economy, especially for the rapidly growing transport sector.  In the influential 
‘wedges’ analysis by S. Pacala and R. Socolow
ci, one of the fifteen potential ‘wedges’ 
judged capable of reducing global emissions by 1GtC, is ‘biomass [in place of] fossil 
fuel’.  The European Union and its member governments are among those
cii pressing 
ahead with ambitious targets for increased biofuels consumption, with each member 
state to achieve at least 5.75% biofuel usage of all vehicle traffic by 2010 and 10% 
by 2020
ciii.  But such policies could well prove counterproductive unless and until 
policies are reformed and there are significant technological breakthroughs.  
 
One of the main concerns about rapid increase in biofuel production and consumption 
is that it will require large amounts of valuable agricultural land and scarce water. At 
present, Germany uses about 12% of its cultivated land for biofuel crops to produce 
just 2% of the transport fuel it consumes [check]. Pacala and Socolow suggest that to 
reduce global emissions by 1GtC, two billion 60mpg cars would need to run on 100% 
biofuels by 2050.  Using current technologies, this would require 100 times current 
Brazil or US ethanol production on 250 million hectares, or one-sixth, of the world’s 
cropland.  For current technology, the majority of new land coming under cultivation 
for biofuels to meet growing demand is likely to be in the global south, thanks to 
typical pr advantage is enormous. Combined with growing concern that climate 
change will reduce availability of cultivatable land in vulnerable regions
civ, increased 
demand for biofuels could increase pressure on scarce water supplies
cv in some 
regions and on vulnerable tropical habitats.  
 
Other concerns are that, contrary to claims by industry and government, the current 
generation of biofuels may make little contribution to emission reductions compared 
to other investments
cvi, and could even lead to substantial increases in the release of 
greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. In northern regions such as Europe and North 
America, current production methods achieve a ‘net energy value’ that is only 
narrowly positive – that is, you only get out 20 to 30% more energy than you put 
in
cvii.  The net energy value from crops such as sugar cane and palm oil grown in 
tropical regions is better, other things being equal. But rapidly rising demand for 
biofuel in Europe and other industrialized countries could, it is feared, increase 
pressure for deforestation and other forms of land use change that lead to high 
emissions of greenhouse gases and are also damaging in other ways. One study 
indicates that greenhouse gas emissions per unit energy combusted in a vehicle engine 
are up to ten times higher for palm oil grown on tropical forest or peat land that has 
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been cleared for the purpose than they are for fossil fuels
cviii.  Other concerns
cix 
include a rapid increase in very poor conditions for agricultural workers, and negative 
impacts on biodiversity in remaining areas of high endemism. 
 
New techniques, such as cellulosic biomass by microbial ‘metabolic engineering’, 
may produce biofuels fuels from undifferentiated biomass, requiring much less land 
and far lower energy inputs.  Researchers say the full potential of cellulosic ethanol 
may be obtained in the next 10 to 15 years
cx.   But even if this prediction proves 
correct there is still likely to be a period of 10 to 20 years in which the world will 
continue to depend on current biofuel technologies.  If the critics are correct, targets 
and incentives to increase consumption during this period may lead to increased 









The governments in Canada, Japan, and the countries of the European Union (EU) 
accepted a responsibility to be first movers in greenhouse gas emission reductions 
when they ratified the Kyoto Protocol
cxi. Canada and Japan remained pledged to their 
Kyoto targets, but are far off trend for meeting these targets, and have not set anything 
in place beyond 2008-2012.  
 
The EU as a whole may miss its Kyoto target, but not by as much as Canada and 
Japan. It has also promised to go further, with a pledge to reduce emissions by 20% 
by 2020, and more if other countries agree to similar reductions
cxii.  
 
The government of Australia has refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol or set any targets 
for actual emission reduction, but has taken a range of steps to increase the efficiency 





Australian industry has consistently argued that the Australian government should 
only pursue policies that are flexible and cost-effective in their own right, and that 
have the least negative impact on competitiveness, investment, regional development 
and jobs
cxiv.  This lobbying
cxv, allied to the heavy dependence of the Australian 
economy on the mining and minerals industries, has strongly influenced the 
Australian government’s approach to both international negotiations and domestic 
policy.   
 
While it has continued to play an active role in the international processes around the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
cxvi and the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Australian government has actively sought to work with other 
countries – in particular, the United States – to develop alternative international 
approaches to the target-based approach of the Kyoto Protocol.  Perhaps the most 
significant activity in this regard has been the leadership role played by Australia in 
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establishing, along with the United States, China, Japan, India and the Republic of 
Korea, the Asia–Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate in 2005.  The 
aim of the partnership is to develop global agreements on climate change based on 
clean technology development and deployment rather than the emissions target 
approach used in the Kyoto Protocol
cxvii.  In addition, Australia works with six 
bilateral climate change partners - China, the United States, New Zealand, Japan, the 
European Union, South Africa - on practical cooperative projects responding to global 
climate change.  More than 50 projects in areas such as renewable energy, coal mine 
methane capture, energy efficiency, and carbon sequestration are now under way 
through these partnerships
cxviii.  Australia also participates in four multilateral 
partnerships that focus on technology: the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
Partnership, the Methane to Markets Partnership, the International Partnership on the 
Hydrogen Economy and the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum. 
 
Australia has adopted a range of policy measures at the Commonwealth, State and 
Territory, and local government levels directed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  
At the Commonwealth level, the emphasis has been on ‘no regrets measures’, where a 
no regrets measure is defined as ‘a measure that has other net benefits (or, at least, no 
net costs) besides limiting greenhouse gas emissions or conserving or enhancing 
greenhouse gas sinks’
cxix.  That is, the emphasis of policy has been on encouraging 
Australian industry to contribute to reducing greenhouse gas emissions while not 
threatening Australia’s international competitiveness
cxx.   
 
Despite the focus on no regrets measures, the Commonwealth government has 
committed around 2 billion dollars (Australian) to greenhouse issues since 1997
cxxi.  
The Commonwealth government’s Climate Change Strategy
cxxii incorporates a mix of 
policy measures including consumer and corporate education, voluntary corporate 
participation in emission reduction activities, seed funding for renewable energy 
innovations, mandatory standards for power generation, energy-use efficiency and 
vehicle fuel efficiency, the mandatory uptake of new renewable energy in power 
supply, research and policy development into sinks and emissions, and fostering 
growth in plantation forestry and native vegetation.  These measures are projected to 
deliver greenhouse emissions abatement of 87 MT CO2(eq) by 2010
cxxiii  
 
Some of the key policy measures that have been adopted include
cxxiv:  
 
•  The Greenhouse Gas Abatement Programme
cxxv which is designed to leverage 
private sector investment in activities or technologies that will result in substantial 
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions or sink enhancement, particularly in the 
Kyoto target period (2008–2012).  
  The Greenhouse Challenge Plus (discussed as case study in section 4 below) 
  The A$500 million Low Emissions Technology Demonstration Fund which will 
operate from 2005–2020 to support the demonstration of new low-emission 
technologies with significant long-term greenhouse abatement potential, and to 
support industry-led projects to demonstrate the commercial viability of new 
technologies or processes, or the application of overseas technologies or processes 
to Australian circumstances. The fund aims to leverage at least A$1 billion in 
contributions from the corporate sector.  
  The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target which will secure 9,500 Gigawatt-
hours of additional renewable energy electricity by 2010.  In addition, the 
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Commonwealth Government has various programmes to support the 
commercialisation and use of renewable energy technologies. 
  The  Solar Cities programme which will provide $75 million over nine years 
(2004–2013) to demonstrate the costs and benefits of solar power, energy 
efficiency and smart metering technologies.  
  The Greenhouse Action in Regional Australia programme which aims to 
coordinate greenhouse action across the land sectors and build the capacity of the 
agriculture and land management sectors to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
promoting forest sink enhancement and the integration of forest sinks and 
greenhouse issues with natural resource management.  
 
One of the most significant influences on Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions has 
been the introduction of a wholesale electricity market across Australia, which has 
increased the carbon intensity of electricity generation (through favouring low cost 
brown coal power producers)
cxxvi.  The Commonwealth government has acted to 
address (at least partially) this market failure by requiring electricity suppliers and 
large purchasers to increase the quantity of renewable energy purchased by 2 per cent 
by 2010
cxxvii, as well as providing funding for the commercialisation of renewable 
energy technologies.  Market liberalisation has also led to reductions in energy prices 
in real terms for most consumers in most regions.  The relatively low price of 
electricity in Australia has been a barrier to effective demand side management; in 
Australia, the rate of improvement in end use energy efficiency in Australia over the 
past decade has been about half the OECD average
cxxviii.   
 
While most current policy measures are directed at allowing Australia to meet its 
Kyoto Protocol commitments, a number of the measures (e.g. the Low Emissions 
Technology Demonstration Fund, the Solar Cities trial, a $100 million Renewable 
Energy Development Initiative) seek to deliver greenhouse gas abatement options 
beyond the Kyoto compliance period.  Notwithstanding these measures, Australia’s 
greenhouse gas emissions are expected to be 127% of the 1990 level by 2020. 
 
In parallel to the Commonwealth government’s activities, each State and Territory has 
established a greenhouse strategy to address those issues with a bearing on climate 
change – for example, waste management, the planning and development of power 
plants, land use and transport planning and vegetation management - that fall under its 
jurisdiction
cxxix.  There are two noteworthy features of the State and Territory policy 
frameworks. The first is that a number have acknowledged the need for significant 
cuts in greenhouse gas emissions in order to avert the most serious effects of climate 
change.  For example, Victoria has suggested that it will need to reduce its emissions 
by 75% of current levels, with substantial progress towards this goal required in the 
first half of the 21
st century
cxxx.  Similarly, New South Wales has set a target of 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 60% by 2050
cxxxi.  In contrast, the 
Commonwealth government which has not set targets beyond the Kyoto Protocol 
compliance period of 2008-2012. 
 
The second is that the States and Territories have taken a strong lead on the issue of 
emissions trading
cxxxii, despite the Commonwealth government emphasising that it 
will not introduce emissions trading in the absence of an international emissions 
trading scheme.  In January 2004, the First Ministers of State and Territory 
Governments established a working group of senior officials (subsequently named the 
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National Emissions Trading Taskforce) to develop a model for a national emissions 
trading scheme
cxxxiii.  The group issued a public discussion paper in August 2006 on 
the possible design of such a scheme
cxxxiv.  The paper suggests that national emissions 
trading could begin by 2010, but it is too early to gauge how influential this activity 
will be, given the Commonwealth government’s strong opposition to the idea of 
emissions trading. 
 
The structure of the Australian economy – in particular the dependence on the mining 
and minerals industry and on access to low cost energy – has been the key influence 
on Australia’s approach to international climate change negotiations and to domestic 
policy.   
 
While Australia expects to meet its Kyoto Protocol compliance commitments, this is 
primarily due to the significant emissions reductions from the land use, land use 
change and forestry sector.  Otherwise, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions have 
grown significantly ahead of its Kyoto Protocol targets.  Beyond 2012, Australia 
expects its greenhouse gas emissions to grow significantly (by approximately 27% 
over 1990 levels through to 2020). 
 
The public policy measures that have been adopted to date are consistent with 
Australia’s desire not to disadvantage its businesses.  The major policy approaches 
have been voluntary measures such as the Greenhouse Challenge programme and 
significant financial support or subsidies for renewable and cleaner energy.  As yet, 
the Australian government has not implemented the stronger policy measures, for 
example, emissions trading, necessary to direct the Australian economy towards 
significant reductions in its greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
The lack of policy certainty or clear targets beyond 2012 and the absence of a ‘price’ 
for carbon represent key barriers to the investments – for example, in clean coal - 
necessary to significantly reduce Australia’s greenhouse emissions.  In order to 
remove these barriers, the Commonwealth government needs to signal its 
commitment to significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions over the next 30 to 
50 years, and commence the implementation of the policy measures – in particular 
emissions trading and prioritising energy efficiency in the electricity generation sector 





In the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, Canada agreed to reduce GHG emissions by 6% below 
1990 levels by the 2008-2012 commitment period. The Kyoto Protocol was not 
officially ratified until December 17, 2002, due in large part to concerns of opposition 
parties in Parliament and Alberta and other provinces that the failure of the US to 
ratify Kyoto would hurt Canada’s competitiveness
cxxxvi. The delay in ratification 
slowed development of a federal implementation plan. The first thorough plan for 
meeting the Kyoto target was released in late 2002, around the time of ratification.  
 
The 2002 Climate Change Plan for Canada called for meeting the national Kyoto 
target by 2010 through purchasing of offsets from other nations, credits for exports of 
clean energy, credits for forestry practices (“sinks”) and a variety of new and existing 
programs
cxxxvii. The new programs included a emissions cap and trade system for 
  23Draft only – not for quotation   
large final emitters or LFEs – heavy industry including oil and gas, mining, 
manufacturing and electricity generation – that are responsible for almost half of the 
domestic GHG emissions. Other emissions cuts were expected to come from 
voluntary initiatives like the One Tonne Challenge, begun in 2004, which promoted 
ways the average Canadian could reduce their personal greenhouse gas emissions by 
20% or one tonne. 
 
On April 13, 2005 the federal government released a Project Green, an updated plan 
to meet the projected 270 Mt gap between business-as-usual emissions in 2010 and 
the Kyoto target
cxxxviii. The core of the updated policy was:  
 
•  A $4-5 billion federal “Climate Fund” which would be used to purchase 
domestic and international offsets, including clean energy, co-generation of 
energy from industry, carbon sequestration projects and capture of landfill gas 
•  A $2-3 billion partnership fund to support emissions reduction by the 
provinces and the private sector, including carbon capture and storage and 
clean coal technology. 
•  A updated cap and trade system for the LFEs, in which targets were based on 
emissions intensity rather than total emissions.  
 
The plan was criticized
cxxxix for reliance of voluntary measures, including a voluntary 
agreement with the large automotive sector
cxl and emissions offsets. The LFEs were 
responsible for only one-eighth of the burden for the emissions reductions, and they 
could comply by purchasing carbon offsets or investing in a technology fund, rather 
than reducing actual emissions. A recent report by Canada’s Auditor General, a 
watchdog for federal government policies, concluded that the national climate change 




In January of 2006, a new minority government led by the Conservative Party 
assumed power and cancelled all federal climate change programs stating the Kyoto 
target was impossible to achieve with so little time. In the fall, the government 
released a new Clean Air Act that called for a 45-65% reduction in GHG emissions 
below 2003 levels by 2050, but contained no specific policies and no binding targets 
before 2020
cxlii. Recent initiatives before the Canadian Parliament and political 
pressure have led to a review of the Clean Air Act
cxliii and may force government to 




A new policy with both short-term and long-term targets and a specific prescription 
for meeting at least a fraction of the Kyoto target is the most likely outcome of the 
current political unrest. One example, a plan released by Stéphane Dion, leader of the 
opposition Liberal party and Environment Minister under the previous government, 
pledges to meet the Kyoto target through the Project Green programs, public 
financing for energy efficiency improvements, expansion of wind power and other 
renewable energies, and reduction of tax breaks for development in the Alberta oil 
sands
cxlv. The plan also endorses the need for a binding long-term target for emissions 
reduction target (e.g., 60% below 1990 levels by 2050) and automotive fuel 
efficiency. 
 




The first concern for the Japanese government is to meet its commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol Achievement Plan released by the Japanese 
Government in April 2005 spells out targets for all sectors
cxlvii.  
 
It is important, however, to note that the targets in the Achievement Plan are 
described as “orientational/indicative targets”, and are not backed up by any 
obligatory measures or potential sanctions. The Kyoto Protocol Achievement Plan 
includes a lengthy description of measures to be taken both by key 
sectors/stakeholders and by the government, but there is no over-arching policy 
instrument to ensure the actual implementation of such measures by key players in 
society.  
 
In July 2006 the Ministry of the Environment released a progress report on the 
Achievement Plan, stating it would be necessary both to strengthen present measures 
and introduce new, additional policy tools to meet Japan’s Kyoto Target. The 
progress report does not describe in any great detail comprehensive or over-arching 
policy tools (such as an EU-like cap-and-trade system or environmental taxation), but 
points to thirteen major areas in which a strengthening of present measures could have 
significant impact, defined as a reduction potential of more than 10 million tonnes of 
CO2 per area by 2010. The thirteen areas are: 
 
(1) Realization and further strengthening of [Keidanren’s] Voluntary Environmental 
Action Plan (see case study in section 4.3. below). Reduction potential:  42.4 
MtCO2 by 2010. 
(2) Improvement of energy efficiency in buildings. An accelerated plan for energy 
efficiency improvement could yield a reduction of 25.5 MtCO2CO2 by 2010. 
(3) Further promotion of Building Energy Management Systems and Home Energy 
Management Systems. 
Reduction potential: 11.2 MtCO2 by 2010. 
(4) Improvement of energy efficiency in houses. An accelerated plan for energy 
efficiency improvement could yield a reduction of 8.5 MtCO2 by 2010. 
(5) Further promoting nuclear power (and increasing operational efficiency of nuclear 
power plants) and other measures to lower CO2 emissions in electricity 
production. Reduction potential:  17 MtCO2by 2010. 
(6) Promotion of new energy sources (in particular solar and biomass). Reduction 
potential:  46.9 MtCO2 by 2010. 
(7) Promotion of co-generation equipment and the use of fuel cells. Reduction 
potential:  11.4 MtCO2by 2010. 
(8) Further acceleration of top-runner program [see below] for the improvement of 
vehicle fuel efficiency. Through the natural replacement of inefficient vehicles 
with more efficient vehicles and through further technological and policy 
measures to continue fuel efficiency improvements, a reduction of 21.13 MtCO2 is 
possible by 2010. 
(9) Further acceleration and broader introduction of top-runner approach to electric 
appliances. Through the natural replacement of electrical appliances as well as the 
introduction of the top-runner approach to a wider range of appliances, including 
microwave ovens, rice cookers, gas-based grill devices, etc.) a reduction of 29.01 
MtCO2 is possible by 2010. 
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(10)  Systematic promotion of new materials in industry, in particular non-freon 
aerosols, non-freon polystyrene, SF6-free magnesium alloys, etc. Reduction 
potential:  43.6 MtCO2 by 2010. 
(11)   The recovery of HFCs used as coolant in automobiles and other devices (in 
accordance with existing legislation). Reduction potential:  12.38 MtCO2 by 2010. 
(12)   Replanting and better maintenance of forests/forestry. Reduction potential:   
47.67 MtCO2 by 2010
cxlviii. 
(13)    Purchase of 100 million tonnes CERs (certified emissions reductions) 
between 2006-2013 under the Kyoto Mechanism
cxlix. 
 
The Achievement Plan is under continuous revision as of early 2007, and a first draft 
report on potential additional measures is expected in March, 2007. It is expected that 
additional budget measures will be proposed by summer 2007 and finalized around 
December 2007, following the Japanese budget cycle. Talks with officials from both 
the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 
January 2007, however, indicate that as of early 2007, “nothing has been decided.” It 
is not clear what specific measures will be taken to close the significant gap existing 
between Japan’s Kyoto Target and actual emissions (as indicated above, the gap 
reached 14.1% as of end of 2005).  
 
3.5. The European Union 
 
The European Union has endorsed an objective for all developed countries to make a 
30% cut in greenhouse gas emissions with respect to 1990 levels by 2020, and has 
made what it calls a ‘firm independent commitment’ to a cut its own emissions by 
20% by that date. It also says that all developed countries should work with a view to 
cuts of 60% to 80% by 2050
cl.  This position puts it ahead of any other developed 
country or group of developed countries.   
 
One of the biggest challenges, however, is likely to be showing that the EU can 
actually achieve its own interim commitment for 2020. As Peter Sutherland, chair of 
BP and chair of a group of wise mean appointed to advises the European Commission 
on energy observed, ‘What we don’t want to see is the agreement at the council 




The combination of projected increases in energy demand in many sectors (especially 
transport), and the need to take account of emissions that have not previously been 
counted (such as aviation and shipping) mean that the 20% reduction target is likely 
to remain challenging.  
 
Some analysts express concern that what should be the primary goal – emission 
reduction – may be side-tracked as more effort goes towards goals that are secondary 
to actual emission reduction.  One example is an EU-wide renewable energy target (of 
20% from renewables by 2020) Some entities may also press for ways to keep 
emissions from certain sectors ‘off balance’ (not recorded in national totals).   
 
Case Study: Climate change policy – is the UK really the leader of the pack? 
 
The UK government says it is on track to double emission cuts required under the 
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Kyoto Protocol.  But there are signs of increasing difficulty ahead. UK emissions rose 
by 1.25% in 2006, thanks in part to increased coal combustion
clii. 
 
In March 2007 the United Kingdom government published draft Climate Change Bill 
which aims to put in place a framework to achieve a mandatory 60% cut in the UK's 
carbon by 2050 compared to 1990 levels, with an intermediate target of between 26% 
and 32% by 2020. If approved, the UK is likely to become the first country to require 
such a long-range and significant carbon reduction target in law. 
 
But an independent audit of the UK's actual climate change policies
cliii predicts that 
the government will fail to meet its interim target for 2020 by some margin. It 
projects that the true reduction on will be between 12 and 17%.  
 
The 30% cut by 2020 relative to 1990 levels is a self-imposed government target that 
goes beyond the UK's obligations under the Kyoto protocol. The UCL team's 12 to 
17% figure is based on downgrading the predictions considering the likely effects of 
policies. 
 
For example, the government predicts that national transport emissions will rise by 
4m tonnes MtCO2. But this assumes that car manufacturers deliver on voluntary fuel 
efficiency targets. Such milestones have never been hit. The team also believes the 
government's projections for the number of car journey's in 2020 are an 
underestimate. The report predicts that emissions from national transport will actually 
rise by between 7m and 13m tonnes. 
 
In the domestic energy sector, one much-trumpeted government policy is a set of new 
building regulations to make all new homes built after 2016 ‘zero carbon’. However, 
the UCL auditors are sceptical that this policy will deliver because of poor 
enforcement. 
 
The researchers also believe domestic energy consumption will continue to rise faster 




An analysis of the Climate Change Bill by researchers at the Tyndall Centre
clv says: 
 
• The atmospheric concentrations implied by the logic of the Bill are upwards of 
600ppmv CO2, and could well be in excess of 750ppmv CO2. 
• The targets are more likely to contribute to a world 4°C or 5°C warmer than 
pre-industrial, than they are to constrain warming to no more than 2°C.  
• The carbon reduction targets within the Draft Bill should be re-visited, be 
evidence based and be in keeping with the latest IPCC science on the subject. 
• All Government reference to targets, temperatures and concentrations should be 
informed by a clear understanding of the science and of the ‘correlation trail’ 
between temperature and emission pathways. 
• The Bill should provide joined-up climate change legislation in which emissions 
from all sectors are factored into the emission pathway. However, even with 
the Bill’s current neglect of aviation and shipping, the emission pathway it 
describes correlates approximately with an 80% and 60% chance of exceeding 
2°C and 3°C warming respectively. 









There has been a broad range of responses from major corporations (in the extractive 
industries, manufacturing, finance, retail and other sectors) with operations in 
Australia, Canada, Japan and the countries of the European Union to pressure for 
emissions reductions.   While few now dispute the science of climate change and the 
need in principle for economies as a whole to reduce emissions, many corporations, 
especially in energy-intensive sectors, favour voluntary rather than mandatory 
approaches for their own sectors (see section 2.3.2 above).   Where cap-and-trade 
systems are in place, many corporations have pressed successfully for free right rights 
to emit as against having to pay, through auctions or other mechanisms, for this 
valuable and scare resource (see section 5 below for a focus on cap and trade).   
 
For an increasing number of corporate players, climate change is seen through the 
lens of risks and/or opportunities. Some major players in insurance and finance, for 
example, have called for strong and early action to manage the risk of climate change, 
with unambiguous commitment from government and long term targets for emission 
reduction.,  And in a few sectors, such as venture capital, renewable energy and 
energy service firms see market opportunities in the challenges ahead. Some 
industries see a competitive advantage in ‘eco-efficiency’. 
 
4.2. Obfuscation or co-operation 
 
Early corporate responses to climate change can be put into two broad categories: 
those seeking to challenge the scientific consensus and the need for mandatory action 
to reduce emissions; and those which accept the science and the need for action and 
seek to shape the terms on which action is taken.   
 
The most notable example in the first category was probably the US-based Global 
Climate Coalition, created in 1989 by the US oil and automotive industries and the 
National Association of Manufacturers to oppose mandatory actions to address global 
warming. (Many GCC members had a significant presence in Australia, Canada, the 
European Union and Japan). In 1997, following intensive lobbying and advertising by 
the GCC, the US Senate overwhelmingly passed a resolution against ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol
clvi. In 2002 the GCC considered its work in the US against 
regulation on global warming to have been so successful that it ‘deactivated’ itself. 
Some major corporations quit the GCC to join groups such as the Pew Center on 
Global Climate Change and other non-partisan initiatives which see climate 




In the second category are groups such as the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development, created in 1995, which describes its mission as ‘to provide business 
leadership as a catalyst for change toward sustainable development’
clviii.  A recent 
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WBCSD publication envisages establishing by 2020 a ‘pathway for the management 
of global greenhouse gas emissions’
clix.   Another example is the 3C initiative
clx, 
which ‘aims [to form] a global opinion group consisting of companies showing 
leadership by demanding an integration of climate issues into the world of markets 
and trade facilitated by means of a global framework coming into force in 2013’
clxi. 
Also in early 2007, a group of representatives from major companies, trade bodies 
and other organizations
clxii calling themselves the Global Roundtable on Climate 
Change endorsed what they called a ‘bold post-Kyoto framework for affecting change 
at the levels of policy and industry, particularly in regard to creating sustainable 
energy systems necessary for achieving economic growth’
clxiii. 
4.3.  Eco-efficiency and risk management 
 
Many companies have favoured an emphasis on eco-efficiency – ‘doing more with 
less’
clxiv.  This approach can lead to substantial emission reductions
clxv, but sometimes 
these are not as great as they may appear. GE, for example, has stressed that its 
‘Ecomagination’ approach will reduce the company’s ‘greenhouse gas intensity’ (the 
quantity emitted per unit of economic activity) by 30%, but has placed less emphasis 
on projections that because of company growth the actual resulting emission 
reductions are likely to be on the order of 1%.    
 
Increased clarity and pressure for disclosure from the finance and insurance sectors 
and from civil society, is tending to drive change. Examples from the insurance 
industry include Swiss Re, the world's second largest reinsurance company, which in 
2004 estimated that the economic costs of climate-related disasters threatened to reach 
$150 billion a year within ten years. In 2006 Lloyd’s of London published a report 
highlighting the latest science and implications for the insurance industry
clxvi. A 
leading initiative supported by investors is the Carbon Disclosure Project
clxvii, which 
says its web site is ‘the largest registry of corporate greenhouse gas emissions in the 
world’




4.4. A way forward 
 
With greater certainty regarding the science thanks to the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment 
Report, and increasing understanding of the costs of not tackling climate change 
(thanks in large part to the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change
clxx), the 
business sector is more ready than before to accept limits on greenhouse gas 
emissions. Many recognized new commercial opportunities in emission 
reductions
clxxi.    
 
The business case for responsible action on climate change has been one in principle. 
The challenge of enforcement remains
clxxii. So long as all emissions from corporate 
activity are taken into account, and not just the ones some companies would wish to 
highlight, the corporate sector can benefit its bottom line, its shareholders, all nations 
and the planet.  
 
 
Case Study 1 – the Japanese Voluntary Action Plan
clxxiii
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The backbone of Japanese industry’s climate change mitigation measures is the 
“Voluntary Action Plan” first established by Nippon Keidanren, Japan Business 
Federation, in 1997 - the year of the Kyoto Conference. Seven major industry 
associations (electronics, steel and metals, oil and gas, mining, trade, construction, 
and chemicals) work with their individual corporate members to meet targets set in 
the Voluntary Action Plan. Industrial emissions from these seven industry groups 
account for 90% of total industrial emissions in Japan
clxxiv. 
 
The overall target set in 1997 was to reduce emissions in 2010 to the 1990 level. 
Targets set in the voluntary action plan, thus, do not relate directly to the Kyoto 
Protocol, nor are there any sanctions for corporations who fail to meet targets. As of 
early 2007, this target (1990 level emissions) was achieved, or estimated to be 
achievable, in most industries, and in total emissions from the industrial sector were 
some 3.2% below 1990 level by end of 2005 (preliminary figures).    
 
One major problem with this voluntary plan is that corporations are free to set targets 
either as absolute reduction targets or as efficiency targets relative to sales or energy 
usage. As a result of this, there is no uniformity in target setting, with some industries 
setting multiple targets, some focusing on reduction targets relative to sales, some 
relative to energy usage, and some committing to absolute emissions reductions.  
 
In March 2005, the Central Environment Council, under the auspices of the Ministry 
of the Environment, recommended that the Japanese government should urge Nippon 
Keidanren to work with the Council and the Ministry of the Environment to ensure 
that the targets set in the Voluntary Action Plan are met, and to strive for further 
emissions reductions where possible. On the basis of this recommendation, a “follow-
up” process commenced with seven industry working groups set up by Nippon 
Keidanren. In December 2006, these working groups reported to the Central 
Environment Council on achievements and further potential reduction measures were 
discussed. This process has not yet reached its conclusion as of February 2007. 
 
The Japanese Government in the Kyoto Protocol Achievement Plan released in April 
2005, encourages an 8.6% reduction of CO2 by 2010 (as compared to 1990) from the 
industrial sector. It is unclear how the gap between Nippon Keidanren’s zero target 
(or from the actual reduction level on 3.2% by 2005) to the Government’s 8.6% 
reduction requirement is to be bridged. Nippon Keidanren has not made any public 
announcements that its members are willing to go beyond the goal of keeping 2010 








The Commonwealth of Australia government established the Greenhouse Challenge 
in 1995 as a voluntary programme for public and private sector organisations to 
undertake and report on their actions to abate greenhouse gas emissions.  The aim was 
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to achieve the maximum practicable greenhouse gas emissions abatement, while not 
compromising business objectives such as development and growth
1.   
 
Organisations wishing to participate in the Greenhouse Challenge were required to 
work through a six-step process, namely establishing and maintaining an inventory of 
greenhouse gas emissions, developing an action plan to minimise greenhouse gas 
emissions or enhance greenhouse sinks, forecasting expected reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions, signing a Cooperative Agreement with the Commonwealth 
government
2, monitoring and reporting on greenhouse gas emissions against targets, 
and being open to independent verification.  The Greenhouse Challenge did not 
involve specific abatement targets being imposed on participating organisations, nor 
were there any sanctions or penalties where forecasts were not achieved.   
 
In May 2004, the Australian government announced budget funding of A$31.6 
million for the Greenhouse Plus – Enhanced Industry Partnerships measure (hereafter 
the Greenhouse Challenge Plus).  The Greenhouse Challenge Plus builds on the 
infrastructure and existing commitments of the Greenhouse Challenge
3, with the 
Cooperative Agreements signed under the Greenhouse Challenge being carried 
forward into Greenhouse Challenge Plus
4.  Participants’ commitments are broadly 
similar to those under the Greenhouse Challenge; participants are required to measure 
and monitor their greenhouse gas emissions, deliver the maximum practicable 
greenhouse gas abatement, continuously improve the management of greenhouse gas 
emissions and sinks, work towards the milestones set in individual agreements, 
provide annual reports to the Australian Greenhouse Office, make a public statement 
about participation in the programme, promote industry participants’ activities and 
participate in independent verification of annual progress reports
5.  The annual 
progress reports are expected to include an updated emissions inventory, a statement 
of absolute changes in emissions, a statement of progress against significant 
abatement actions, changes in emissions intensity, details of the calculation 
methodologies and assumptions used, an indication of which elements of the report 
are not confidential and a sign off by the chief executive or authorised delegate
6. 
 
From 1 July 2006, participation in Greenhouse Challenge Plus is a mandatory 
                                                 
1 Howard (1997) (Note Error! Bookmark not defined.). 
2 Cooperative Agreements were expected to include an emissions inventory, an 
assessment of the opportunities available for abating greenhouse gas emissions, a 
greenhouse action plan, and a commitment to regular monitoring and reporting of 
performance.  Cooperative Agreements can be viewed at 
http://www.greenhouse..gov.au/cgi-bin/challenge/dbsearch.p1 
3 Greenhouse Challenge Plus will also provide the framework for Greenhouse 
Friendly certification (a voluntary initiative that provides Australian businesses with 
the opportunity to market ‘greenhouse-neutral’ products or services) and the 
Generator Efficiency Standards programme (which aims to aim to achieve best 
practice in the efficiency of electricity generation). 
4 AGO (2005b), ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: Programme Framework 2005’ (AGO, 
Canberra, 2005). 
5 AGO (2005b) (Note 4). 
6 AGO (2005b) (Note 4).  
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7 AGO (2005c), ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: An Australian Government-Industry 
Partnership to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Improve Energy Efficiency 
(AGO, Canberra). 
8 AGO (2005c) (Note 7).   
9 AGO (2005b) (Note 4). 
10 AGO (2005b) (Note 4). 
11 AGO (2005d), ‘Australia’s Response to Climate Change’ (AGO, Canberra). 
12 For a current list of members, see: 
 http:www.greenhouse.gov.au/challenge/members/pubs/list_of_challengers.pdf.  It 
was envisaged that 500 companies would have signed Cooperative Agreements by the 
end of 2000 and that 1000 companies would have signed by the end of 2005.  The 
AGO has stated that the mandatory requirements to join the Greenhouse Challenge 
Plus mean that the government’s target of 1000 Greenhouse Challenge members by 
2005 is no longer a useful target or indicator of progress (AGO (2004b), AGO Annual 
Report 2003/2004 (AGO, Canberra) at 27).   
13 See, for example, Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGN) (2005), 
‘Submission on Greenhouse Plus: Industry Consultation Discussion Paper’ (AIGN, 
Melbourne). 
14 Sullivan, R. (2005), Rethinking Voluntary Approaches in Environmental Policy 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham) at 120-122. 
15 Sullivan, R. and Sullivan, J. (2005), ‘Environmental Management Systems and 
their Influence on Corporate Responses to Climate Change’, in Begg, K., van der 
Woerd, F. and Levy, D. (eds.) (2005), The Business of Climate Change: Corporate 
Responses to Kyoto (Greenleaf Publishing, Sheffield), pp. 117-130 at 122.  In the data 
that are available, there is limited evidence that the organisations participating in the 
Greenhouse Challenge went beyond a narrowly defined interpretation of the costs and 
benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction measures.  The majority of the projects 
implemented were either low cost projects or projects that provided very short 
payback periods.  In this context, the Greenhouse Challenge can be said to have been 
economically efficient in that it did not require firms to implement measures beyond 
those that could be clearly justified in economic terms.  A more critical conclusion 
could be that the Greenhouse Challenge did not provide the strong drivers necessary 
to encourage companies to take advantage of all the opportunities that might be 
available (Sullivan (2005) (Note 14) at 115-117).   
16 For a more detailed discussion of the emissions performance of Greenhouse 
Challenge participants, see Sullivan (2005) (Note 14) at 110-115. 
17 It has been argued that many of the ‘easy’ emissions reduction measures (the ‘low 
hanging fruit’) have now been implemented and it will become ever more difficult to 
achieve reductions without incurring economic penalties (Allen Consulting Group 
(2000), Meeting the Kyoto Target: Impact on Regional Australia.  Report by the Allen 
Consulting Group for the Minerals Council of Australia (Allen Consulting Group, 
Melbourne)). 
18 Sullivan (2005) (Note 14) at 123-125. 
19 National Audit Office (2004), The Administration of Major Programs: Australian 
Greenhouse Office (National Audit Office, Canberra) at 43, 70. 
20 National Audit Office (2004) (Note 19) at 82. 
21 See also Sullivan, R. and Ormerod, R. (2002), ‘The Australian Greenhouse 
Challenge: Lessons Learned and Future Directions for Climate Policy’, in Albrecht, J. 
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requirement for Australian companies receiving fuel excise credits of more than A$3 
million and for the proponents of large energy projects
7.  The AGO has estimated that 
these new requirements will affect around 100-200 businesses
8, although it is likely 
that many will previously have been members of the Greenhouse Challenge.   
 
The programme allows participants to be recognised as Greenhouse Challenge Plus 
Leaders if they publicly disclose their gross emission levels, their short-term goals for 
greenhouse, an overview of their climate change strategy and the expected direction 
of future greenhouse gas emissions and mitigating actions
9.  In addition, they are 
expected to develop action plans to meet or exceed their annual greenhouse goals, to 
reference best practice in the development of greenhouse targets and key performance 
indicators, and to encourage their suppliers to take greenhouse actions
10.   
 
The actions taken under the Greenhouse Challenge Plus programme are expected to 




Outcomes from the Greenhouse Challenge 
 
The Greenhouse Challenge has formed the centrepiece of the Australian 
government’s efforts to encourage business to take action on greenhouse gas 
emissions and climate change for over ten years.  Over 750 companies were members 
as at the end of 2006
12 and the programme had significant coverage of Australian 
greenhouse gas emissions with almost total coverage in a number of major industrial 
sectors, including electricity generation and distribution, oil and gas extraction, iron 
and steel and aluminium, and coal mining.   
 
The flexibility provisions in the Greenhouse Challenge were supported by industry as 
enabling cost-effective approaches to greenhouse gas emissions abatement to be 
implemented
13, and the programme has provided a range of important soft effects, in 
                                                                                                                                            
(ed.) (2002), Instruments for Climate Policy (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham), pp. 170-
191 at 184-187 
22 For a more detailed assessment of the potential contribution of Greenhouse 
Challenge Plus, see Sullivan, R. (2006), ‘Greenhouse Challenge Plus: A New 
Departure or More of the Same?’, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vol. 23, 
No. 1, pp. 60-73. 
23 See, for example, the comments of the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network 
which has argued that the priority for the Australian government should be to raise the 
profile of the voluntary approach to greenhouse, rather than singling out leaders for 
specific praise (AIGN (2005) (Note 13)). 
24 AGO (2005b) (Note 4) at 4. 
25 As a consequence, Sullivan (2006: 71) suggests: “The consequence is that 
organisations are likely to continue to make economically sub-optimal decisions on 
investments in energy efficiency or greenhouse gas abatement.  This, in turn, means 
that the incentives for innovation will continue to be weak.” (Sullivan (2006) (Note 
22)).  
26 AGO (2005e), “Industry-Government Greenhouse Partnership Committee” (AGO, 
Canberra, 2005). 
27 See, for example, AIGN (2005) (Note 13). 
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particular making greenhouse and climate issues a part of management decision-
making processes
14.   
 
Despite these positive outcomes, the overall contribution of the Greenhouse 
Challenge to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from Australian business appears to 
have been relatively modest.  The Greenhouse Challenge did not provide strong 
incentives for participating organisations to set greenhouse gas emission reduction 
targets beyond business as usual, and the existence of the Greenhouse Challenge was 
used by industry to deflect calls for the introduction of stronger policy measures such 
as emissions trading.  It appears that the major contributions of the Greenhouse 
Challenge were to encourage some organisations to bring forward some energy saving 
or greenhouse gas emission reduction projects and to help participating organisations 
to identify opportunities that provided clear short-term financial benefits
15.  While 
many of the participants stabilised their greenhouse gas emissions over the period 
1995 to 2000
16, emissions from Australian business as whole have continued to rise, 
with emissions from the electricity sector some 35% higher in 2004 than in 1990 and 
emissions from industrial processes 18% higher
17.   
 
While Australian business has strongly supported the Greenhouse Challenge, 
environmental groups argued that the Greenhouse Challenge was simply a public 
relations campaign for activities that would have happened anyway
18.  Environmental 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) expressed concern about the close 
relationship between government and industry in the Greenhouse Challenge, in 
particular the emphasis on the confidentiality of industry data and the absence of a 
formal role for NGOs in the Joint Consultation Committee (JCC) which oversaw the 
operation of the Greenhouse Challenge.   
 
As a final comment on the Greenhouse Challenge, it is difficult to evaluate the precise 
contribution that the programme has made to achieving greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions.   In a 2004 review, the National Audit Office noted that the emissions 
reductions claimed for the Greenhouse Challenge did not take account of what would 
have happened in the absence of the Greenhouse Challenge, the effect of corporate 
environmental management systems, or the effect of State and Territory greenhouse 
programmes
19.  The review also highlighted significant inconsistencies in the 
emissions reductions that the government had predicted for participating organisations 
and the actual reductions achieved
20.  Furthermore, given that participating 
organisations were free to define their own baselines and business as usual 
performance, there was clearly the potential for participating firms to overstate their 
expected emissions growth thereby allowing them to claim that they have achieved 
even greater reductions in emissions
21.   
 
Expected Outcomes from Greenhouse Challenge Plus 
 
The Greenhouse Challenge Plus appears to address some of the weaknesses of the 
Greenhouse Challenge
22.  First, the Greenhouse Challenge Plus is not a purely 
voluntary programme but offers clear financial incentives for certain companies to 
participate although, given that many of these companies are already likely to be 
participants, this may not result in a significant increase in membership of the 
programme.  Secondly, the Greenhouse Challenge Plus now differentiates between 
participating companies.   The incentives associated with Greenhouse Leaders should, 
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prima facie, encourage companies to go beyond – and stay beyond - minimum 
compliance with the requirements of the programme.  It remains to be seen how many 
companies will actually decide to become Greenhouse Leaders, as companies may be 
concerned that a failure to continue to meet the requirements of Greenhouse Leaders 
will lead to criticism or negative press coverage
23.  Thirdly, the improved disclosure 
requirements (in terms of the information that companies are required to put into the 
public domain) should address at least some of the NGO concerns about the lack of 
transparency.  However, it is pertinent to note that the Greenhouse Challenge Plus 
retains its strong emphasis on the protection of commercial information
24 and it is 
therefore likely that NGOs will continue to be critical of the programme in this 
regard.   
 
However, many of the weaknesses of the Greenhouse Challenge remain unaddressed.  
Most importantly, the Greenhouse Challenge Plus does not impose specific 
performance targets on participating companies or provide strong incentives for 
companies to significantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions beyond business as 
usual
25.  A further issue is that the oversight structure (the Industry-Government 
Partnership Committee) that has been established for the Greenhouse Challenge Plus 
continues to exclude key stakeholders
26.  It is therefore likely that environmental 
NGOs will continue to criticise the programme.  Finally, the Greenhouse Challenge 
Plus may be less acceptable to Australian industry, which has expressed concern at 
the move away from the strictly voluntary approach that characterised the Greenhouse 
Challenge










The basic theory of carbon trading is simple. An agreement is made to cap, or limit, 
a pollutant (in this case carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases) at a certain 
level.  Permits, or credits, are then allocated to countries, firms, industries and/or 
other entities (even individuals) to emit a stated amount over a given time period. 
Those whose emissions exceed the credits they possess at the end of the period 
will be penalised. Permit or credit holders are then free to trade these with each 
other in a free market. Entities that can reduce their emissions at a low cost will do 
so and then sell credits to others who are unable to do so (hence ‘cap and trade’). 
A shortage of credits will drive up the price of credits and make it more profitable 
for firms to engage in pollution reduction. In this way the desired reduction is met 
at the lowest cost possible to society.  Over sequential periods the cap is 
progressively tightened
clxxvi. Perhaps the most frequently cited model of a cap and 




Carbon trading was included in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol as one of the options 
available to countries with mandatory emission reduction targets.  The Protocol came 
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into force in 2005. Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) those 
countries are allowed to ‘earn’ credits by investing in offset projects that cut 
emissions in developing countries which have no Kyoto targets. With costs of 
emission reduction typically much lower in developing countries than in 
industrialised countries, it is reasoned, industrialised countries can comply with 
their emission reduction targets at much lower cost by receiving credits for 
emissions reduced in developing countries as long as administration costs are low. 
The most popular location for projects generating carbon credits under the CDM in 
2006 was China, which took a 63 per cent share of the market. India generated 12 per 
cent of credits and Africa nearly 6 per cent, up from about 2.5 per cent in 2005. 
The European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS) began trading in January 
2005. Each participating country has a National Allocation Plan (NAP)
clxxviii 
specifying emissions caps on emissions for individual power plants and factories in 
energy-hungry industries (e.g. iron and steel, cement, glass, paper).  In aggregate 
these facilities and factories account at present for approximately 45% of greenhouse 
gas emissions by the EU. Each one gets a maximum amount of emission allowances 
for a given period (e.g. 2005-2007 and 2008-2012) and may trade with other facilities 
that have an excess or deficit of allowances. Progressively tightening caps are 
foreseen for each new period, forcing overall reductions in emissions. Between 
inception and November 2006, the EUETS traded contracts totaling about 18 billion 
euros (US$23.1 billion)
clxxix. About one billion tonnes of CO2 were traded during this 
period, equivalent to the annual greenhouse gas emissions of Germany, Europe’s 
largest emitter.   
All the other carbon trading arrangements in operation at present are smaller than the 
CDM and EUETS, and in most cases they are voluntary. One example is the Chicago 
Climate Exchange, ‘the world’s first and North America’s only voluntary, legally 
binding greenhouse gas reduction and trading system for emission sources and 
offset projects in North America and Brazil’
clxxx.  A mandatory scheme has been 
envisaged for the State of California
clxxxi, and may be an option at the inter-provincial 
level in Canada
clxxxii. Many US corporations see a cap and trade system as inevitable 
for the US by 2012.  
Some corporations have also experimented with internal carbon trading systems 
between business units. The best known example is probably BP, which operated an 
internal emissions trading system between 1999 and 2001. The company said this 
helped reduce operational greenhouse gas emissions by 10 percent at no net economic 
cost
clxxxiii (during this time, however, the quantity of oil and gas produced and sold by 
BP continued to increase).  Several large multinational corporations are calling for 
extension and development of existing carbon trading arrangements
clxxxiv, including 
US-CAP, which regards cap and trade as an essential element in what it says is a 
pressing need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions world wide
clxxxv.  
 
Carbon trading markets have grown rapidly in recent years. According to an estimate 
by the World Bank, US$22bn worth of greenhouse gas emissions was traded world 
wide in the first nine months of 2006, compared with over $10bn in the whole of 
2005. Of this, about $3bn took place within the CDM and $19bn in the EUETS
clxxxvi. 
Investment banks, including Goldman Sachs, Barclays Capital and JPMorgan, have 
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expanded into the carbon emissions trading market, mainly through their energy and 
commodity trading desks. In October 2006 Morgan Stanley announced plans to invest 
about $3bn in carbon credits and energy projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 




Demand for Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) under the terms of the CDM is 
likely to remain strong during the first period of the Kyoto Protocol. The government 
of Japan, for example, estimates that it will need to buy 100 million tonnes CERs 
under between 2006-2013 as part of its programme to meet its commitments. At the 
time of writing the future of the CDM beyond the end of the Kyoto commitment 
period is uncertain.  The EU pledge of a 20% reduction in emissions by 2020 may 
indicate parameters for the EUETS at least until that date.    
5.2. Do they work? 
 
Both the Clean Development Mechanism and the European Union Emission Trading 
Scheme have been strongly criticised.   But criticisms are different in each case. 
Critics of the CDM tend to argue that the emission reductions it claims to achieve 
would have been achieved anyway. In the case of the EUETS, criticisms to date have 
tended to focus on what are said to be excessively generous national allocation plans 
by EU member governments which mean that little or no real reduction has been 
achieved.  Defenders of the CDM and EUETS argue that the schemes are in the first 
phase, with lessons being learned that will lead to better operation in future. 
 
Under CDM, approved projects are required to show ‘additionality’. This is a 
contested term with two main interpretations: ‘environmental additionality’, which 
holds that a project is additional if the emissions from the project are lower than the 
baseline; and ‘project additionality’, defined as projects that would not have happened 
without the CDM.  Advocates of the CDM tend to agree it is not possible to establish 
with absolute certainty what would have happened without the CDM or in absence of 
a particular project. They argue, however, that a good estimate can be made using the 
official guidelines set by the CDM Executive Board for assessing additionality
clxxxviii. 
 
Another criticism of the CDM is that, far from achieving emissions reductions at a 
lower cost, the largest projects so far have paid up to 50 times more for the emission 
reductions than the costs alone would warrant, with the ‘excessive profits’ ending up 
with the factories and the carbon traders
clxxxix. According to one estimate, €4.6 billion 
spent under CDM on the destruction of HFC gases
cxc would have would cost only 
€100 million if funded by development agencies. The UNFCCC says the loophole is 
now closed and that new HFC-23 facilities will no longer be eligible for CDM 
credits
cxci. The international emission trading association (Ieta) has expressed support 
for HFC-23 emission reduction projects. It says they have been ‘hugely successful’, 




Some analysts say critics of the CDM are missing the point. It was not designed to be 
a mechanism for development, poverty alleviation or technology transfer, but simply 
to facilitate the greatest abatement at the lowest marginal cost.  In this, they say, it has 




The first phase of the EUETS, running from 2005 to 2007, has been criticized for 
offering ‘no incentive’ for emission cuts
cxciv. This followed revelations in April and 
May 2006 that many companies were issued more allowances than they needed by 
national governments.  As a result the price of carbon collapsed
cxcv. However, despite 
the problem of over-allocation, estimate to be some 100 million tonnes of CO2 in 
2005, some studies have argued that abatement under EUETS probably reduced total 
emissions by between 50 million tonnes and 200 million tonnes
cxcvi.  
5.3. Where next? 
The EUETS is widely seen as a key test case of whether cap and trade can work on 
large scale for greenhouse gas emissions, and potentially the cornerstone for a global 
trading scheme. Almost everyone, from radical anti-capitalist critic to mainstream 
economists, agrees the current scheme has problems.  Proponents of trading argue that 
design flaws in the EU ETS are teething troubles which can be resolved. In January 
2007, for example, the European Commission recommended tighter caps in the 
second phase from 2008 to 2012, changes including more predictability for investors, 
more auctioning of permits
cxcvii, the inclusion of more industry sectors (such as semi-
conductor and refrigeration manufacturers) and widening of the scheme to the 
transport sector, including aviation
cxcviii. 
 
The sheer scale of the scheme means that member states are subject to intense 
lobbying by economically strategic industries.  In the first phase, lobbyists across 
Europe pushed successfully for weak caps, and argued successfully for 
“grandfathering” – for allocations to be based on their emissions in a reference period 
rather than on an overall carbon target, as under Kyoto, or on best practice in the 
industry. If this is repeated in subsequent phases it risks creating a perverse incentive 




Some participant companies in the EUETS have had to buy a few permits in the 
market match actual emissions at the margin in the first phase, but in most cases the 
bulk of permits have been free. This ‘free give away’ of emission permits has been 
challenged
cc.  Some studies indicate that companies increase prices to consumers as if 
they were paying for all their permits. UBS Investment Research calculates that the 
first phase of the EU ETS has added around 1 penny (US 2 cents) to each kilowatt 
hour of electricity. Consultants to Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry said 
that British electricity generators were expected to make windfall profits of around 
£800m in 2005. Consultants for the commission looking at the inclusion of aviation in 
the ETS recently estimated that airlines could make up to €4bn in windfall profits, 
depending on the emissions permit price
cci. Even if such issues are resolved, 
emissions trading schemes such as the ETS can only play a meaningful role in carbon 
budgeting if actual curbs in total emissions are agreed and enforced. 
 
At the time of writing, pressure in the United States for greenhouse gas emissions 
trading is increasing sharply
ccii, with speculation that a scheme will come into 
existence no later than early in the next presidential term, commencing January 2009.   
At least six bills to address climate change are expected to come before the Senate in 
  38Draft only – not for quotation   
2007, with all but one of them including a mandatory ‘cap and trade’ system to limit 
emissions.  Three bills which limit emissions are expected before the House of 
Representatives. Most initiatives see the US as part of an international emissions 
trading scheme similar to Kyoto but with a revised timetable for emission reductions. 
 
 
6. Prescriptions for an accelerated shift to carbon neutral growth 
 
There is no magic bullet for accelerating the transition to a low carbon economy
cciii, 
but directions for action in rich industrial countries such as Australia, Canada, Japan 
and the member states of the European Union are clear.    
 
One, governments must be direct about the risks of not substantially reducing 
emissions, and make clear that they are serious about short, medium and long-term 
targets for emission reductions.  
Two, all emissions associated with the life cycle of goods and services of all 
economic activities, including aviation, shipping and military spending, should be 
counted accurately and completely, and communicated with utmost transparency to 
all sectors and groups of world society.  
 
Three, comprehensive investigation, identification and elimination of subsidies to 
industries, services and other economic activities – including aviation, automobile use 
and agriculture – that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
Four, an old principle – the polluter pays – should be applied consistently and fairly 
with regard to greenhouse gas emissions as much as to any other kind of pollution 
which contributes to severe and irreversible damage of the environment and 
ecosystems on which humanity depends. Emission permits under cap and trade 
systems should no longer be allocated by governments without cost, but should be 
auctioned or otherwise sold for fees which can be applied for abatement and other 
purposes central the over-riding goal of reducing emissions
cciv.  
 
Five, rich country governments should prioritize regulations and incentives that 
actually reduce emissions. In particular, they should address market failure in demand 
management and energy efficiency
ccv,
ccvi. Carbon abatement can be achieved at 
substantial negative cost (i.e. profit) in rich industrialized countries through building 
insulation, fuel efficiency in commercial vehicles, lighting systems, air-conditioning, 
water heating, and electronic equipment standby losses
ccvii.  Governments should 
focus particular attention on these challenges, working with consumers and industry 
to develop innovative ways to address these market failures, and where necessary 
finance up front capital investment, with aggressive targets in particular for efficient 
energy use in the commercial and domestic housing sectors.  In some cases this may 
include mechanisms that deliver a share of the rewards from energy savings to the 
energy providers and/or manufacturers. 
 
Six, it has been shown that voluntary approaches from the commercial sector do not 
delivering actual emission reductions.  Firm targets for efficiency increases through 
regulation must not be allowed to be unpicked by vested interests, as has been the 
case for automobile efficiency in the European Union.   Auctions for emission permits 
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under cap and trade schemes can be recycled at least in part to those companies that 
make the greatest progress in reducing their emission profiles.  
 
Seven, Australia, Canada, the European Union and Japan should reaffirm their 
commitment to tackling climate change in a context of sustainable development and 
justice for the peoples of all nations
ccviii.   This requires that they commit to carbon 
budgets for themselves and also support for developing nations for the most cost 
effective and equitable methods to tackle the challenge those countries will face in 
bringing their own emissions under control while meeting human and economic 
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Notes 
                                                 
i The Varieties of Scientific Experience. Carl Sagan (New York, 2006) quoted in Creating an Alien 
Planet by John Cairns http://www.johncairns.net/Commentaries/Creating_an_Alien_Planet-2.pdf   
ii opening remarks by Sir John Houghton CBE FRS to From Anthropocentrism to Ecocentrism: Making 
the Shift EcoRes Forum E-Conference, 14-30 April 2007 
iii Joint science academies’ statement: Global response to climate change, 7 Jun 2005 
http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/document.asp?id=3222. The statement is endorsed by the national 
academies of science of  Brazil, Canada, China, Italy, India, Japan, France, Germany, Russia, United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
iv Neither the UNFCCC nor the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change define ‘dangerous climate 
change’.  It is argued that the judgement is or should not be solely a scientific one, but also involves 
ethical and political factors. Some impacts may only occur at a regional level – e.g. across one 
continent or a large part of one continent. Stephen H. Schneider and Janica Lane of Stanford University 
write: “in essence, the threshold of what is dangerous depends not only on the probabilities of factors 
like climate sensitivity and adaptive capacity, but on value judgements as to what is acceptable given 
any specific level of warming or damage – and who suffers the damage or pays the adaptation cost”. 
(An Overview of ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change in Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, Schellnhuber 
et al, 2006) 
v European Union 1939th Council meeting, Luxembourg, 25 June 1996: ‘the Council believes that 
global average temperatures should not exceed 2 degrees above pre-industrial level’. Updated at 
Limiting Global Climate Change to 2 degrees Celsius 10 Jan 2007 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/16&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en  
vi There may be significant changes to the earth climate system for an average temperature rise of less 
than 2 C.  For example, the loss of coral reefs which play an important role in supporting fisheries for 
up to several hundred million people and other valuable ecosystem services. 
vii Anthropogenic gases that cause climate change include carbon dioxide, methane nitrous oxide and 
fluorinated gases.  For further details see The Main Greenhouse Gases, Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-
basics/facts_and_figures/climate_science_basics/main_ghgs.cfm  
viii Among key factors regarding the risks of climate change to be taken into account are regional 
distribution of impacts and the timeframe over which they take place.  Some parts of the world may be 
much more severely affected than others. And some impacts of the current atmospheric concentration 
of greenhouse gases (let alone mind its future concentration) may not be apparent for several decades, 
or even more. 
ix The IPCC was established in 1988 by two UN organisations, the World Meteorological Organisation 
and the United Nations Environment Programme, to evaluate the risks of climate change.  
x Fourth Assessment Report Summary for Policy Makers: “AR4”, 2 February 2007 
http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM2feb07.pdf  
xi AR4 page 12 
xii That is, a doubling with respect to the average pre-industrial atmospheric concentration of carbon 
dioxide. The concentration before the industrial revolution that began in the late 18
th century was 
approx 270 parts per million by volume (‘270ppmv’) 
xiii IPPC definitions are: ‘more likely than not’ as a more than 50% probability of an event taking place; 
‘likely’ as more than 66%; ‘very likely’ as more than 90%; and ‘extremely likely’ as more than 95% 
xiv Twice pre-industrial concentration would be approximately 550ppm. The current level is more than 
380ppm (CO2 only). Atmospheric concentrations are rising by approximately 2ppm per year. 
xv "Climate-carbon cycle coupling is expected to add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as the climate 
system warms, but the magnitude of this feedback is uncertain. This increases the uncertainty in the 
trajectory of carbon dioxide emissions required to achieve a particular stabilisation level of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration." 
xvi Some commentators have alleged manipulation and censorship of AR4.  See Climate Report ‘was 
watered down’, New Scientist 8 March 2007, and Political Corruption of the IPCC Report? 
http://www.meridian.org.uk/Resources/Global%20Dynamics/IPCC/index.htm  
xvii What does a 2 C target Mean for Greenhouse Gas Concentrations? Malte Meinhausen in 
Schellnhuber et al, 2006 
xviii CO2e equivalent, or CO2e, is the internationally accepted measure that encapsulates all greenhouse 
gases that contribute to global warming. Some greenhouse gases have a greater ‘global warming 
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potential’, or GWP, than carbon dioxide. (GWP is a measure of how much a given mass of greenhouse 
gas contributes to global warming). Methane, for example, has a GWP 21 times as great as CO2e.   At 
present other greenhouse gases contribute approximately an additional 15% of global warming 
potential.  
xix Emission pathways leading to a 550ppm CO2e stabilisation are unlikely to meet the 2C target.  In 
order to achieve such a target with a probability of more than 85% (60%) global greenhouse gas 
concentrations need to be stabilised at 400 (450) ppmv CO2e or lower.   
“This requires global emissions peak at around 2015 in order to avoid global reduction rates exceeding 
more than 2.5%/yr, followed by substantial overall reductions by as much as 40-45% (15-25%) in 2050 
compared to 1990 levels excluding land use emissions. The reduction requirement become as high as 
50-55% (30-40%) below 1990 levels for 2050 in 2050 for all greenhouse gas emissions including land 
use CO2.” –Multi-Gas Emission Pathways for Meeting the EU2 C Target, Michael den Elzen and 
Malte Meinhausen in Schellnhuber et al, Defra 2006 
xx For example, “to stabilize at 450ppmvCO2e without overshooting, global emissions would need to 
peak in the next ten years and then fall at more than 5% per year, reaching 70% below current levels by 
2050. This is likely to be unachievable with current and foreseeable technologies.” (Stern Review on 
the economics of climate change, Chapter 8, page 218 http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/9A2/DD/ch_8_challenge_of_stabilisation.pdf ) 
xxi See, for example, Risks Associated with Stabilisation Scenarios and Uncertainty in Regional and 
Global Climate Change Impacts, Stainforth et al in Shellnhuber, 2006)  
xxii For example, the World Energy Technology Outlook reference case envisages world energy use to 
by 2.2 as great in 2050 as it is today (albeit for a economy four times as large) resulting in an emission 
profile corresponds to a concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere between 900 to 1000 ppmv by 2050. 
xxiii For example, “to stabilize at 450ppmvCO2e without overshooting, global emissions would need to 
peak in the next ten years and then fall at more than 5% per year, reaching 70% below current levels by 
2050. This is likely to be unachievable with current and foreseeable technologies.” (Stern Review on 
the economics of climate change, Chapter 8, page 218 http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/media/9A2/DD/ch_8_challenge_of_stabilisation.pdf ) 
xxiv  “If the official verdict on climate change seems bad enough, the real story looks far worse”.  
Leading climate scientists identified a series of potential positive feedbacks and “tipping points” not 
included in most current models of the Earth’s climate system that could accelerate global warming of 
sea-level rise.  These include the collapse of the Greenland ice sheet, rapid melting in Antarctica, a shut 
down of the Gulf stream in the Atlantic, and the release of carbon dioxide and methane from soil, the 
ocean bed and melting permafrost.  
xxv August 2006 
xxvi 18 February 07 
xxvii “The climate-carbon cycle is expected to add carbon dioxide to the atmosphere as the climate 
system warms, but the magnitude of this feedback is uncertain. This increases the uncertainty in the 
trajectory of carbon dioxide emissions required to achieve a particular stabilisation level of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration.” AR4, page 17 
xxviii give references for all three, e.g. Yadvinder Malhi (?), X, Carl Wunsch (?) 
xxix This includes, for example, the US government. On 5 February 2007, Sharon Hayes of the White 
House office of Science and Technology Policy said: “This report is a comprehensive and accurate 
reflection of the current state of climate change science”. 
xxx AR4 page 17 
xxxi AR4 appears to be referring to 450ppm CO2 only, not 450ppm CO2e 
xxxii Gigatonne of carbon is commonly abbreviated as GtC.  
xxxiii It should be noted that AR4 appears to be referring to the concentration of CO2 only, whereas what 
‘matters’ is the combined effect of all greenhouse gases, expressed as CO2 equivalent (CO2e).   To 
stabilise the concentration of all greenhouse gases at 450ppm CO2e means stabilising CO2 alone at a 
significantly lower level. The additional forcing factor of other greenhouse gases apart from CO2  
depends on the timespan under consideration, as different greenhouse gases have different atmospheric 
residence times.   Other factors, such as the negative radiative forcing of aerosols should also be taken 
into account. 
xxxiv http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/spm-4a.htm
xxxv In 2004 emissions from fossil fuel use were in the region of 7.4 GtC. See US Energy Information 
Administration http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/iea/carbon.html (report released May- June 2006). [note 
figures are given in Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide. To convert to carbon divide by 3.67]. For a 
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breakdown of estimated carbon dioxide emissions by country see also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_carbon_dioxide_emissions  
xxxvi 57% of total global anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases in 2000 came from burning 
fossil fuels in power, transport, buildings and industry; agriculture and land use changes (particularly 
deforestation) produced 41% of emissions (source WRI 2006 cited in Stern Review p 170).  Total 
global emissions in 2000 from both fossil fuel combustion and non energy emissions (waste, 
agriculture and land use change) were 42GtCO2e or  11.44GtCe 
xxxvii approx. 25.47% of global emissions from fossil fuels in 2004 
xxxviii approx 24.12% of global emissions from fossil fuels in 2004.  Other high income industrial 
nations such as Norway, New Zealand, Singapore and Switzerland are not included in this figure.  
xxxix CO2 is Not the Only Gas, Keith P. Shine and William T. Sturges, Science, 30 March 2007, Vol 
315 
xl This is not always true.  Take the following example. The Netherlands emits 80 million tonnes of 
carbon per year from all activities. Indonesia emits 2,000 million tonnes from forest fires and land use 
change alone – i.e. not including household and commercial consumption of fossil fuels. (Source: 
Marcel Silvius, senior programme manager for Wetlands International, quoted in Smoking Out the 
World’s Lungs, BBC 10 Feb 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/6354079.stm).That 
is, current Indonesian emissions per capita are nearly twice those of the Dutch, even if its emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion are not counted and those of the Netherlands are.  
xli See Brouns and Ott etc. 
xlii http://unfccc.int/2860.php signed in 1992 by 154 nations, now signed by 189 
xliii The principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" recognises that: 1) the largest share 
of historical and current global emissions originated in developed countries; 2) per capita emissions in 
developing countries are still relatively low; and 3) the share of global emissions originating in 
developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs. 
xliv The Annex 1 countries are Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, European Union, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America.    
xlv Those countries that are required to make cuts include Canada, Japan and those of the European 
Union 
xlvi Under the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, Annex I countries agree to reduce their emissions to 
target levels below their 1990 emissions levels. If they cannot do so, they must buy emission credits or 
invest in conservation.  The United States and Australia have signed the UNFCCC but not the Kyoto 
Protocol, and thus are not under a legal obligation to meet ‘Kyoto targets’. 
xlvii Note: need to spell out in final paper what the budget means for world as a whole.  This should 
include a graph here to illustrate emissions trajectories for OECD and non OECD to 2100 
xlviii Multi-gas Emission Pathways for Meeting the EU 2 C Climate Target. Michel den Elzen and Malte 
Meinhausen in Schellnhuber et al, 2006 
xlix Taking the lower bound of IPCC SRES Scenario B1 as maximum global emissions. See 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/spm-3.htm 
l Using conversion factor of 3.67 
li Figures for 1990 and 2004 from the UNHDR Australia country study 
lii Figures for 1990 and 2004 from the UNHDR Canada country study 
liii European Environment Agency 
liv Figures for 1990 and 2004 from the UNHDR Japan country study 
lv On basis that population in 1990 was 18m, in 2004 was 20m and in 2050 will be 40m 
lvi On basis that population in 1990 was 28m, in 2004 was 30m and in 2050 will be 60m 
lvii With EU 25 (i.e not including Romania and Bulgaria) population at 464 million, Japan 130m, 
Canada 32m, Australia 20m, and total world population at 6.5bn 
lviii Assuming populations of EU and Japan increase by 5%, while those of Canada and Australia  
double, and total world population is 9.4bn (US Census bureau estimate at 
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldpop.html ) 
lix citation needed 
lx 1990 is the base line for the Kyoto Protocol, and is also used more generally used as a baseline for 
future measurements.  For example, California is using 1990 as a metric for future reduction targets 
lxi See http://tromoya.grida.no/db/maps/collection/climate9/flash/emissiongraphs.swf for animation of 
difference between projected emissions and Kyoto targets all Annex 1 countries  
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lxii Of which 0.6% was to have come from actual domestic emission reductions, 3.8% from forestry and 
1.6% from purchase of CERs under the Kyoto mechanism.  See Japan country study for more details 
lxiii UNHDR Japan Country Study 
lxiv Japan Proposes Halving Emissions by 2050. AP 24 May 2007 
lxv Greenhouse gas emissions and removals – European Environment Agency, February 2007. For full 
break down of all countries and all sectors by year see tables at 
http://dataservice.eea.europa.eu/dataservice/viewdata/viewpvt.asp  
lxvi That is, members before 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom   
lxvii Making Sweden an oil free society, Commission on Oil Independence, 21 June 2006 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/70/96/7f04f437.pdf  
lxviii The other three were: the impact of oil prices on growth and employment, the link between oil, 
peace and security throughout the world, and the great potential of Sweden’s renewable energy 
resources. 
lxix Towards an Oil Free Economy in Ireland: Lessons from the Swedish Commission for Oil 
Independence Report by Joseph Curtin, IEA Briefing Paper, 10 August 06, 
http://www.iiea.com/images/managed/events_attachments/Towards%20an%20Oil%20Free%20Econo
my%20in%20Ireland-1.pdf  
lxx Making Sweden an oil free society, Commission on Oil Independence, 21 June 2006 
http://www.sweden.gov.se/content/1/c6/06/70/96/7f04f437.pdf  
lxxi See also Background paper by Gregor Czisch including section with overview on Germany 
electricity production 
lxxii Further reading Feed-in Tariffs – Accelerating the Development of Renewable Energy by Miguel 
Mendonca, Earthscan 2007 
lxxiii EEA Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory June 2006 
lxxiv The Guardian 31 Jan 07 
lxxv We call on the EU to abandon targets for biofuel use in Europe. An open letter signed by more than 
200 organisations, 31 Jan 2007, http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/2007Jan31-openletterbiofuels.pdf
lxxvi 061026 T&E Euro auto emissions 
lxxvii Liquid fuels derived from coal would almost certainly mean larger emissions. Biofuels are not 
suitable for use in jet engines. Hydrogen, generated by whatever means, presents significant problems 
of storage. See Green sky thinking: eight ways to a cleaner flying future, New Scientist, 22 Feb 2007 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19325921.600;jsessionid=HJILNFIIMHEB
lxxviii Aviation and the global atmosphere, IPCC 1999 
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/aviation/003.htm   
lxxix http://www.rcep.org.uk/news/02-04.htm  
lxxx This figure is used in a UK Conservative Party document on taxing aircraft emissions, March 2007 
lxxxi Predict and Decide – Aviation, climate change and UK Policy, Environmental Change Unit, 
University of Oxford 2006 
lxxxii CO2 output from shipping twice as much as airlines, The Guardian, 3 March 2007 
lxxxiii by Simon Donner, Princeton University 
lxxxiv Canada’s Energy Outlook: The Reference Case 2006, Analysis and Modeling Division, Natural 
Resources Canada. Available at: http://www.nrcan.gc.ca 
lxxxv Oil Sands Update, Government of Alberta, June 2006. Available at: 
http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/oilsands/ 
lxxxvi ibid 
lxxxvii Canada’s Energy Outlook: The Reference Case 2006, Analysis and Modeling Division, Natural 
Resources Canada. Available at: http://www.nrcan.gc.ca 
lxxxviii Oil Sands Update, Government of Alberta, June 2006. Available at: 
http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/docs/oilsands/ 
lxxxix ibid 
xc Suncor Energy 12
th annual progress report on climate change (2006). Suncor Energy Inc. Available 
at http://www.suncor.com  
xci Pembina Institute. The Climate Implications of Canada’s Oil Sands Development. Available at 
http://www.pembina.org 
xcii Ibid; Canada’s Energy Outlook: The Reference Case 2006, Analysis and Modeling Division, 
Natural Resources Canada. Available at: http://www.nrcan.gc.ca
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xciii Climate Change: The upstream oil and natural gas industry’s contribution to Canada’s debate on 
climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, Canadian Association of Petroleum producers, February 2002. 
Available at http://www.capp.ca 
xciv Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of 
Commons, Office of the Auditor General, Government of Canada, September 2006. Available at: 
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/other.nsf/html/06en03_e.html 
xcvNational Roundtable of the Environment and the Economy, 2006. Advice on a Long-term Strategy 
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cii In January 2007 US President George W Bush announced an ambitious agenda to increase the 
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ciii Directive on the Promotion of the use of biofuels and other renewable fuels for transport, 
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civ Lester R. Brown The Earth Is Shrinking: Advancing Deserts and Rising Seas Squeezing Civilization, 
Earth Policy Institute 15 November 2006,  http://www.earth-policy.org/Updates/2006/Update61.htm 
cv “Surging demand for irrigation to produce food and biofuels is likely to aggravate scarcities of water 
but the world's supply is not running out, according to a report the International Water Management 
Institute”, Reuters, 20 August 2006.  
Biofuels adding to water shortages 
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Press/coverage/pdf/Biofuels%20adding%20to%20water%20shortages.pdf  
Biofuels: implications for agricultural water use  
http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/EWMA/files/papers/Biofuels%20-%20Charlotte.pdf  
cvi The marginal cost of a tonne of CO2(e) abated by production of biodiesel in Europe is much higher 
than bifuel from sugarcane on the cost curve for greenhouse gas reduction described by Per-Anders 
Enkvist, Tomas Nauclér, and Jerker Rosander, McKinsey Quarterly, January 2007, 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/article_page.aspx?ar=1911&L2=3&L3=41  
cvii Michael B McElroy, The Ethanol Illusion, Harvard Magazine, November-December 2006 
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cviii Biofuels less sustainable than realised, Wetlands International, 8 December 2006 
http://www.wetlands.org/news.aspx?ID=804eddfb-4492-4749-85a9-5db67c2f1bb8  
cix See, for example, International Trade in biofuels: Good for development, and good for 
environment? IIED, January 2007. http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/11068IIED.pdf Key messages:  
“1) The realisation of environmental and social benefits of biofuels is not straightforward. The trade-
offs need to become clearer to all players. 2) International trade will play a key role in determining the 
final outcomes. However, distortions in agricultural and energy trade regimes, the myriad of standards 
and the lack of a clear biofuel classification in the multilateral trade regime, suggest that biofuels might 
not deliver sustainable development gains for all trading partners. 3) Industrialised countries need to 
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cxi Some sub national jurisdictions in the US, Australia and elsewhere have set themselves Kyoto type 
targets, and/or more similar or more ambitious ones. Ref – [New South Wales, California]. Japan has 
not yet set a post Kyoto target (see Japan country study). 
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cl Presidency Conclusions, 8/9 March 2007, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/93135.pdf See especially 
paragraphs 30 to 32: 
‘30. The European Council reaffirms that absolute emission reduction commitments are the backbone 
of a global carbon market. Developed countries should continue to take the lead by committing to 
collectively reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases in the order of 30% by 2020 compared to 
1990. They should do so also with a view to collectively reducing their emissions by 60% to 80% by 
2050 compared to 1990.  
31. In this context, the European Council endorses an EU objective of a 30% reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990 as its contribution to a global and comprehensive agreement 
for the period beyond 2012, provided that other developed  countries commit themselves to comparable 
emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to contributing adequately 
according to their responsibilities  
and respective capabilities. It invites these countries to come forward with proposals for their 
contributions to the post-2012 agreement.  
32. The European Council emphasises that the EU is committed to transforming Europe into a highly 
energy-efficient and low greenhouse-gas-emitting economy and decides that, until a global and 
comprehensive post-2012 agreement is concluded, and without prejudice to its position in international 
negotiations, the EU makes a firm independent commitment to achieve at least a 20% reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared to 1990.’  
cli BP chairman warns EU on emissions fight, The Financial Times, 18 March 2007 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f81146a0-d57f-11db-a5c6-000b5df10621.html
clii Coal comeback pushes up UK emissions, The Guardian, 29 March 2007 
cliii UK Greenhouse gas emissions: Are we on target? Environment Institute, University College 
London, March 2007 http://www.ucl.ac.uk/environment-institute/pdfs/UCLEI-report.pdf  
cliv UK plans to cut CO2 doomed to fail – scientists, The Guardian, 5 March 2007 
clv Kevin Anderson and Alice Bows, Tyndall Briefing Note 17, March 2007 
http://www.tyndall.ac.uk/publications/briefing_notes/bn17.pdf
clvi In 1998 the New York Times published an America Petroleum Institute (API) memo outlining a 
strategy aiming to make ‘recognition of uncertainty ... part of the ‘conventional wisdom.’” The memo 
has been compared to a late 1960s memo by tobacco company Brown and Williamson which stated: 
“Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact' that exists in the 
mind of the general public. It is also the means of establishing a controversy”.  
clvii See, for example  Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air: How ExxonMobil Uses Big Tobacco’s Tactics   
to Manufacture Uncertainty on Climate Science, Union of Concerned Scientists, January 2007 
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http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf  
clviii WBCSD members include General Motors, DuPont, 3M, Deutsche Bank, Coca-Cola, Sony, 
Caterpillar Inc., BP and Royal Dutch Schell. It also works with a network of more than national and 
regional business councils  
clix Policy Directions to 2050 – A business contribution to the dialogues on co-operative action, March 
2007. See ‘An international framework built on national approaches’ (page 6). The report does not 
suggest a specific target for atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, but introduces two 
scenarios for trajectories to 900ppm and 550pm by 2050 (page 3).  
http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?type=DocDet&ObjectId=MjM0OTQ  
clx http://www.combatclimatechange.org/about.html Members include ABB, Alcan, Alstom, Areva, 
Bayer, BP, Centrica, CEZ Group, Deutsche Bahn AG, Deutsche Post World Net, Duke Energy, 
Endesa, EnBW, Enel, E.ON, Eskom, Fortum, GE, Lufthansa, Norske Skog, NRG Energy, Nuon, Otto 
Group, PG&E Corporation, PNM Resources, Reuters, Siemens, Suez, RAO UES of Russia, Wallenius 
Lines and Vattenfall. 
clxi In its guiding principles, 3C notes that it may be necessary to stabilise at less than 550ppmv: 
‘According to present knowledge, the goal should be to stabilise the carbon dioxide equivalent 
concentration at a level below 550 parts per million (volume) in order to stabilise the temperature 
increase at an acceptable level. There are signals indicating that the acceptable concentration level 
may have to be even lower in the future. [Emphasis added] The long-term goal must be based on 
sound scientific and economic analyses. An assessment process should be designed to monitor the 
progress’. http://www.combatclimatechange.org/guiding_principles.html#6  
clxii Full list of participants at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/grocc/participants.html
clxiii ‘The Path to Climate Sustainability’:￿A Joint Statement by the Global Roundtable on Climate 
Change  20 February 2007, http://www.earth.columbia.edu/grocc/grocc4_statement.html The 
Roundtable describes its over-arching objectives over the period 2005 to 2009 as: to explore the 
potential for developing an improved global consensus on core scientific, technological, economic and 
policy issues related to climate change; to explore technological and policy options for mitigating 
climate change while meeting global energy needs; to champion demonstration projects that test and 
scale sustainable energy technologies and other activities and policies that address climate change; to 
provide a unique forum for discussion, analysis and exchange of ideas among businesses from all 
economic sectors and all parts of the world, international institutions, non-governmental organizations, 
and leading academic experts; and to help catalyze new initiatives and interactions among Roundtable 
participants that address climate change mitigation and adaptation. ￿ 
clxiv Among notable examples are BP’s internal emissions trading scheme, which is said to have 
reduced emissions from operations by some 10%, and GE’s ‘Ecomagination’. 
clxv Dupont, for example, says it will reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 65% with respect to 1990 
levels by 2010. See The Climate Group case study: 
http://theclimategroup.org/reducing_emissions/case_study/dupont/  
clxvi Climate Change: Adapt or Bust http://www.lloyds.com/NR/rdonlyres/38782611-5ED3-4FDC-
85A4-5DEAA88A2DA0/0/FINAL360climatechangereport.pdf  
clxvii http://www.cdproject.net/
clxviii Reporting by some companies has been challenged: ‘In February 2007, a report by the NGO 
Christian Aid found that Greenhouse gas emissions running into hundreds of millions of tonnes had not 
been disclosed by Britain's biggest businesses, masking the full extent of the UK's contribution to 
global warming. Only 16 of Britain's top 100 listed companies are meeting the government's most 
elementary reporting guidelines on greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, almost 200m tonnes of CO2 
is estimated to be missing from the annual reports of FTSE 100 companies. The figure is more than the 
entire annual emissions of Pakistan and Greece combined.’
 
http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/0702_climate/index.htm  
clxix As of 1st February 2007 
clxx http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm 
In February 2007 the Stern team published a response to critics of their economic analysis Value 
judgements, welfare weights and discounting at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/independent_reviews/stern_review_economics_climate_change/sternreview_index.cfm  
clxxi  Two sectors tipped for growth are 1) providers of energy efficiency and 2) renewable energy. For 
example, the Dutch company Phillips launched a ‘campaign’ in Washington DC in March 2007 to 
phase out all inefficient lighting in North America by 2016. Replacing the approximately 4 billion 
incandescent light bulbs in the United States with energy efficient ones would cut the US’s annual 
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electricity bill by $18bn, and cut CO2 emissions by 158Mt, says the company.   Also in March 2007 
the European Lamp Companies Federation (ELC) today announced the ‘first-ever joint industry 
commitment to support a government shift to more efficient lighting products for the home’ The ELC 
estimates that there are 3.6 billion inefficient lamps in use in Europe. Assuming that an average of 50% 
of energy consumed could be saved by changing to energy efficient home lighting, Europe could save 
approximately 23 megatonnes of CO2, which is equal to the output of 27 power plants (@ 2TWh) or 
electricity cost saving of 7 billion Euros ( http://www.elcfed.org/index.php?mode=0 ).  Revenue from 
clean-energy companies worldwide increased nearly 39% to a collective $55.4 billion last year, 
according to a research report released this month by Clean Edge. By 2016, the collective revenue of 
such companies could reach $226.5 billion, the report said. 
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070326/FREE/70323010
clxxii An analysis by the UK NGO Christian Aid published in February 2007 found that major 
corporations in the London FTSE 100 were under-reporting their emissions some 191.42MtCO2 – 
nearly 35% of total UK emissions (CO2 only) Coming Clean: Revealing the UK’s true carbon 
footprint http://www.christianaid.org.uk/indepth/0702_climate/missingcarbon.pdf  
clxxiii by Peter David Pedersen, e-squareinc.com  
clxxiv Follow-up on the Voluntary Action Plan, METI, Dec. 21, 2006 (Japanese only) 
clxxv by Rory Sullivan, Insight Investment 
clxxvi Chapters 14 and 15 of the Stern Review have extensive discussions on emission trading schemes 
and carbon taxes 
clxxvii See, for example, Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/rff/dpaper/dp-05-05.html 
clxxviii http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission_plans.htm 
clxxix Point Carbon, 21 November 2006 
clxxx The Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) says that ‘To date, more than 120 CCX Members range 
from corporations like Ford and Motorola, to state and municipalities such as Oakland and Chicago, to 
educational institutions such as Tufts University and University of Minnesota, to farmers and the Iowa 
Farm Bureau. CCX has an aggregate baseline of 226 million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent, which is 
equal to the United Kingdom’s annual allocation under the EU ETS. This would make CCX one of the 
largest ‘countries’ in the EU CO2 market, or 4% of U.S. annual GHG emissions’. 
http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/  
clxxxi PUC to set cap on greenhouse gas emissions, 16 Feb 2006 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/getfile.php?docID=1485 
clxxxii Canada emissions trade seen worth C$12 bln, 14 March 2007 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/index.php?IdSitePage=1355  
clxxxiii On BP see Pew Climate 
http://www.pewclimate.org/companies_leading_the_way_belc/company_profiles/bp_amoco/trading.cf
m   For a business oriented overview see Climatebiz backgrounder: emissions trading 
http://www.climatebiz.com/sections/backgrounder_detail.cfm?UseKeyword=Emissions%20Trading  
clxxxiv For example, The Evolution of Global Carbon Trading Announced at World Economic Forum, 29 
Jan 2007 
http://www.climatebiz.com/sections/news_detail.cfm?NewsID=34507&Section=Emissions%20Trading&ImageName=hdr%5Fsect
%5Femiss%5Ftrade%2Egif&Section=Emissions%20Trading  See also section on corporate initiatives in this paper 
clxxxv A Call for Action - Consensus Principles and Recommendations from the US Climate Action 
Partnership http://www.us-cap.org/ClimateReport.pdf
clxxxvi Financial Times, 16 November 2006 
clxxxvii Morgan Stanley makes $3bn green pledge, Financial Times, 26 October 2006 
clxxxviii Tool for the demonstration and assessment of additionality. UNFCCC 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/PAmethodologies/AdditionalityTools/Additionality_tool.pdf  
clxxxix Is the global carbon market working? Michael Wara, Nature, February 8, 2007 
http://cesp.stanford.edu/news/967/   (see also Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s  
Performance and Potential by Michael Wara, Stanford PESD paper no.56  http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/21211/Wara_CDM.pdf. Billions lost in Kyoto carbon trade loophole, Financial 
Times, 8 Feb 2007 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c07a48b4-b6d9-11db-8bc2-0000779e2340.html
cxc  CHF3, also known as R-23 or HFC-23, is a potent greenhouse gas, with a global warming potential 
11,700 times as great as carbon dioxide and an atmospheric lifetime of 260 years 
cxci Kyoto Protocol 'loophole' has cost $6 billion, New Scientist, 9 Feb 2007 
http://environment.newscientist.com/article/dn11155-kyoto-protocol-loophole-has-cost-6-billion.html
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cxcii Emission traders defend HFC-23 projects, 3 March 2007 
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/www/pages/index.php?IdSitePage=1344  
cxciii Personal communication, officer with a company trading CERs under the CDM. The company had 
no involvement in the HFC-23 projects in China or elsewhere. 
cxciv ‘The EU emissions trading scheme has not encouraged installations to reduce their emissions, 
according to one of the companies covered by the scheme. “Let’s be realistic and honest, the market 
was long in the first phase, so the EUETS has given no extra incentives for greenhouse gas 
reductions or changes to the fuel mix,” Philip Luyten, environment manager at Total 
Petrochemicals’. ENDS 1 Feb 2007 
cxcv In an analysis of the Phase I National Allocation Plans (National Allocation Plans 2005-07 Do they 
deliver? http://www.climnet.org/EUenergy/ET/NAPsReport_Summary0306.pdf), the NGO Climate 
Action Network called the caps a 'major disappointment'. CAN argued that only the UK and Germany 
of the 25 EU states asked the participating industry sectors to reduce emissions compared to historic 
levels and found that in the 15 old EU member states as a whole allocations were 4.3% higher than the 
base year. In May 2006, when several countries revealed registries indicating that their industries had 
been allocated more allowances than they could use, trading prices crashed from about €30/ton to 
€10/ton, and after a slight recovery declined to €4 in January 2007 and below €1 in February 2007 
cxcvi Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Eni Enrico Mattei Foundation. 28 November 2006 
cxcvii “The UK’s long-term aim is to move away from free allocation and towards full auctioning as the 
most efficient allocation methodology. This will ensure the cost of carbon is fully taken into account 
and provide greater incentives for firms to develop cleaner technology than allocating allowances for 
free” – Ian Pearson, UK Minister of State for Climate Change and Environment, quoted in ENDS 
report, 1 Feb 2007. 
cxcviii See, for example Trading Up: Reforming the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme, 
IPPR, December 2006 
cxcix This analysis thanks to Matthew Lockwood, A Rough Guide to Carbon Trading, Prospect 
Magazine, January 2007 
cc and not only by NGOs  “The UK’s long-term aim is to move away from free allocation and towards 
full auctioning as the most efficient allocation methodology. This will ensure the cost of carbon is fully 
taken into account and provide greater incentives for firms to develop cleaner technology than 
allocating allowances for free” – Ian Pearson, UK Minister of State for Climate Change and 
Environment, quoted in ENDS report, 1 Feb 2007. 
cci IPPR op cit http://www.ippr.org.uk/pressreleases/?id=2488  
ccii Climate Policy Frenzy continues in US Congress, Point Carbon, 28 March 2007, 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/getfile.php/fileelement_105855/Carbon_Market_North_America_28_Mar
ch_2007.pdf
cciii For a thorough analysis of the challenges see Stern Review, especially parts III (The economics of 
stabilisation) to VI (International collective action) 
cciv The limitations of existing cap and trade sytems embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and the EUETS 
are not be limited to free allocation of permits.  Alternatives, with potentially lower transaction costs 
and less scope for abuse, should be further explored. These alternatives include more ‘straight’ carbon 
taxes and alternative trading arrangements such as that outlined in ‘Kyoto 2’ http://www.kyoto2.org 
under which those seeking to extract and sell carbon based fuels would have to take part in auctions. 
ccv  “Even if the energy efficiency of the world economy – gross world product per unit energy – were 
to continue to increase at the long term historical rate of about 1% per year, the realisation of middle or 
the road population and economic projections would entail quadrupling of energy use in this century. 
In a world where today one third of primary energy comes from oil and 80% comes from oil, coal and 
natural gas combined (virtually all the carbon dioxide from the combustion of which continues to go 
straight into the atmosphere), that middle of the road energy trajectory cannot be managed simply by 
expanding what we are already doing. Such a path is not merely unsustainable; it is a prescription for 
disaster” John Holdren, Science , 9 Feb 2007 
ccvi EREC/Greenpeace scenario – proven RE and efficient decentralised cogeneration – excludes CCS 
and nuclear energy – worldwide final energy demand reduced by 47% 
ccvii A cost curve for greenhouse gas reduction by Per-Anders Enkvist, Tomas Nauclér, and Jerker 
Rosander McKinsey Quarterly 2007 No 1 
ccviii A renewed agenda 20 years after Brundtland has been suggested: ‘A 20-year international effort to 
put the planet on a path to sustainable development has been woefully inadequate and will need a 
radical rethink if it is to achieve its aims’ according to a report by the International Institute for 
  51Draft only – not for quotation   
                                                                                                                                            
Environment and Development (IIED). The new approach would require 1) Traditional, local and non-
Western approaches to play a major role in a new, globally constructed and globally shared drive 
towards genuine sustainable development: 2) A shift from the inviolability of economic growth to the 
inviolability of human well-being and environmental limits; and 3) Governments to account for the 
economic and social benefits that natural resources provide and the costs of mismanaging these 
environmental assets. http://www.iied.org/mediaroom/docs/new_era.pdf  
  52